



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

IMPROVING THE CURRENT DHS CAPABILITIES FRAMEWORK

by

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September 2008

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IMPROVING THE CURRENT DHS CAPABILITIES FRAMEWORK

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ABSTRACT

After the 9/11/2001 terrorist attack, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8). The intent of the directive was to establish a mechanism improving our ability to protect against, prevent, respond to and recover from any occurrence. Interim guidance established complimentary initiatives toward a national system for developing capabilities: National Preparedness Goal, Universal Tasks and Target Capabilities. The effectiveness of the guidance, however, is hampered by several incongruities and conflicting efforts with other similar federal initiatives. There is not one consistent approach either in content or application for identifying or developing jurisdictional capabilities.

The current capability initiative was developed over a short timeframe with a focus on the intent of Presidential Directives, Congressional concerns and mandated deadlines. The development of the current initiative was done through consultation and not collaboration with all the involved stakeholders. The research and development of this thesis to “Improve the Current DHS Capabilities Framework” relied on stakeholder input, years of emergency management experience, and a period of 18 months to study all the elements. The intent of this thesis is to enhance current efforts by proposing a framework that is reflective of the homeland security and emergency management community or jurisdictional needs.

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I. INTRODUCTION

To set the stage for the thesis, the following will include an overview and a discussion of the document elements. The thesis elements include: the issue statement, information regarding the literature review conducted, a synopsis of the main argument regarding capabilities, the approach to the subject matter research, the significance of the research and a synopsis of the chapters to follow.

A. OVERVIEW

Two major disasters, within the last six years, have highlighted the importance of developing capabilities to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from any type of incident, emergency, or disaster. On September 11, 2001, one of the most devastating terrorist attacks occurred in the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report emphasized the inadequacy of the country's capabilities, "Before 9/11, the United States tried to solve the Al Qaeda problem with the same government institutions and capabilities it had used in the last stages of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. These capabilities were insufficient, but little was done to expand or reform them."¹ The report identified capabilities as one of the four major failures, "We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management."² On August 29, 2005, the most devastating natural disaster, Hurricane Katrina, struck the Gulf Coast region. Once again, capabilities fell short of performing as intended. As stated in a *Katrina Lessons Learned* document, "This demand, coupled with the austere conditions throughout the Gulf Coast following Katrina's landfall, exceeded FEMA's standard disaster delivery capabilities and processes."³ The attacks of 9/11 delivered the wake-up call regarding capabilities and Hurricane Katrina drove the point home. Secretary Michael Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security, drew attention to the importance of

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), <https://www.llis.dhs.gov> (accessed June 25, 2007), 368.

² *Ibid.*, 356.

³ White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), https://www.llis.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=15644 (accessed June 25, 2007), 49.

capabilities in his remarks to the International Fire Chiefs Association, “This tragedy has emphasized how critical it is that we ensure our planning and response capabilities perform with seamless integrity and efficiency in any type of disaster situation – even one of cataclysmic nature.”⁴ The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction was established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 1999, Public Law 105-261. The panel was responsible for assessing the federal government support to state and local government in combating terrorism. After the 9/11 attack, the panel was directed to submit additional reports. The final *Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities* report was issued on December 15, 2003 summarizing the findings. The panel captured the essence and criticality of capabilities in its statement, “Moreover, the fragmentation of responsibilities and capabilities within the federal structure, among governments at all levels, and with the private sector requires our urgent attention.”⁵

B. ISSUE STATEMENT

The events of 9/11 caused the United States to look closely at current response and recovery mechanisms among federal, state, local, and tribal governments. Federal efforts resulted in several directives to guide the nation’s development. *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8* (HSPD 8) and its corresponding *National Preparedness Goal* (NPG) set the stage for a coordinated system of capability development outlining 37 target capabilities. The effectiveness of this guidance is hampered by several incongruities and conflicting efforts with other similar federal initiatives. As referenced later in this chapter, the work of Davis and Caudle infers the capability initiatives are inappropriately designed and not formulated by true collaboration. In my years of experience as a Homeland Security Advisor, the lack of collaboration and partnership has provided a recipe for top-down federally directed initiatives verified by consultation with

⁴ Michael Chertoff, *Keynote Address - International Association of Fire Chief’s Leadership Summit* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 2005) http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0262.shtm (accessed June 24, 2007).

⁵ Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Forging America’s New Normalcy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003) <https://www.llis.dhs.gov> (accessed June 25, 2007), 13.

state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. This method or approach of development has not proven the most effective avenue for integrating the guidance into current practices that were not considered in the development of an initiative. In other words, there is not one consistent approach in either content or application for identifying or developing capabilities.

The research findings indicated that several incongruities existed within the current framework for developing capabilities. These incongruities led to several questions:

- How do the partners develop a coordinated capability framework when federal principles and guidance are uncoordinated with the implementers and create development incongruities?
- How do partners identify the necessary capabilities to develop?
- What approach should the partners use toward identifying the appropriate capabilities that require development to achieve the intended outcome?
- What process should the partners use to develop applicable jurisdictional capabilities?
- What process should be used to identify a national set of capabilities?
- Is the current capability development framework adequate to achieve the intended outcome?

The intent of the current capabilities initiative is well intended. These questions and the identified incongruities direct the research to consider a formative approach, discovering strengths and weaknesses toward identifying a better architecture. This focus leads directly to the research question, “How can the current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) capabilities framework be improved?”

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The subject of capability development is a national initiative to develop sustainable efforts across the country to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from any type of incident, emergency, or disaster. The literature devoted to capabilities is found in various federal documents, after-action review material and research analysis addressing the subject. The federal documents and subsequent guidance is the foundation material that establishes the developmental direction for capabilities. This material is

categorized as presidential directives, policy reviews, and government reports. After-action review material addresses the effectiveness of implementing capabilities. Research literature is comprised of academic analysis or publication material on the subject. The following material will discuss each of these elements and the respective findings.

1. Federal Documents

a. Presidential Directives

Several directives and federal initiatives establish the basis for capability development. The foundation-setting document is HSPD 8. HSPD 8 calls for the development of the NPG. “This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal...and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of federal, state, and local entities.”⁶ The NPG is the parent for two capabilities based planning documents: *Target Capabilities List* (TCL) and the *Universal Task List* (UTE).” The TCL and UTL inform communities and states what they can do to bolster their preparedness by providing guidance on specific tasks and capabilities. The National Planning Scenarios provide a basis for a consistent approach for disaster planning regardless of the scope and size of the specific scenario.”⁷ HSPD 8 and the NPG are the foundation for the national program, which includes the *National Response Plan* (NRP) and its revised 2007 version, the *National Response Framework* (NRF).

⁶ President, *Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 8* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003> (accessed June 12, 2007), 1.

⁷ U.S. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Department of Homeland Security Statement of the Honorable George W. Forseman – Under Secretary for Preparedness* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1166567952901.shtm (accessed June 10, 2007), 1.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) is an initiative “to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system.”⁸ The initiative is termed the *National Incident Management System* (NIMS).

b. Policy Reviews

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued only one policy review report regarding capability effectiveness with respect to the Katrina response. The report indicates that capabilities do not provide an efficient mechanism to deal with incidents, emergencies, or disasters. The report reflects that there is much work to be done.

c. Government Reports

The 9/11 Commission Report emphasized the inadequacy of the country’s capabilities. The report emphasized that capabilities were insufficient and this insufficiency is considered one of the four major failures in dealing with the aftermath of 9/11.⁹

The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction exposes disconnects between the various levels of government and the private sector.¹⁰

2. After-Action Reviews

All of the after-action review material is a bonified approach to help assess capability effectiveness. The reviews identified that a noticeable deficiency existed

⁸ President, *Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 5* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003>, (accessed June 12, 2007), 1.

⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), <https://www.llis.dhs.gov> (accessed June 25, 2007), 368.

¹⁰ Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Forging America’s New Normalcy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), <https://www.llis.dhs.gov> (accessed June 25, 2007), 13.

regarding capabilities. There was no apparent divergence in the report documents, only a qualifying statement referenced above by Secretary Chertoff focusing on preparedness and response capabilities.

3. Research Literature

a. Academic Analysis

Dr. Sharon Caudle completed research regarding the Capability-Based-Planning (CBP) process and approach. Her studies indicate that the DHS system is flawed and the approach is inappropriate. She reflects on the Department of Defense (DOD) experience in comparison to the DHS approach - the military learned the importance of stakeholders and that they should be part of the process to ensure ownership. Meanwhile, the DHS approach used consultants to develop the volumes of documents and did not approach the development in a true collaborative partnership with the stakeholders, state, and local government. “The end result has been ‘push back’ from key state and local stakeholders, confusion about intent and requirements, and lack of understanding of CBP and what it is intended to do.”¹¹

In researching many other pieces of literature, none of them focuses on the CBP process from a global perspective. In other words, the documents focus on a specific aspect of the approach such as assessing the appropriateness of capabilities. Other research focuses on applying CBP for specific initiatives such as establishing threat assessments. The unattended piece of the CBP approach is how it may need to be adjusted to accommodate the development of capabilities in the homeland security and emergency management communities. In lieu of the fact that CBP may not be the ultimate answer to developing capabilities, other methodologies were researched to determine their applicability.

¹¹ Sharon L. Caudle, “Homeland Security Capabilities-Based Planning: Lessons from the Defense Community,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 1, no. 2 (Fall 2005), <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.2> (accessed June 12, 2007), 8.

b. Publications

Paul K. Davis of the RAND Corporation has worked with DOD in applying CBP for military initiatives. The industry theory is that this process has not had much exposure outside of that arena. Davis states, “It is necessary to develop broad wherewithal to cope with diverse circumstances, rather than fine-tuning plans based on specific scenarios.”¹² The Davis information indicates that the federal approach using 15 scenarios is too specific and not global enough to achieve an all-hazard focus.

An issue report developed by the Trust for America’s Health addresses capabilities with regard to bioterrorism. The report establishes that capabilities are in place at varying levels and much work is yet to be done in the public health arena.

In summary, all of the referenced documents speak to the CBP process in some fashion. In view of my experience this past five years as a Homeland Security Advisor attending many national meetings and conference calls regarding capabilities, Davis and Caudle are right on the mark and validate what advisors across the country have been experiencing for the last four years. Homeland Security Advisors have expressed their concern to DHS, on more than one occasion, regarding the top-down non-collaborative development approach. This approach has caused further disconnects and the inability to develop capabilities consistently. In conclusion, the material researched indicates there is a need for uniformity regarding capability development. There are many inconsistencies or incongruities because of the uncoordinated approach among federal agencies, and, in partnerships with state, local, tribal, and territorial government. Current practice indicates that either CBP or Effects-Based-Planning (EBP) is an applicable approach for developing capabilities. Further research is needed to determine whether there are other processes being used that would be more appropriate. Perhaps the result will be the use of another tool, reconfiguring the CBP approach to parallel the needs of homeland security and emergency management capability development or developing a new tool that is a culmination of those currently available.

¹² Paul K. Davis, *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 37.

D. ARGUMENT

Capability development is critical to effectively preventing, protecting against, responding to, or recovering from incidents, emergencies, or disasters. State, local, tribal, and territorial governments follow federal directives, initiatives, and guidance for developing capabilities. They are held accountable for adhering to the federal parameters by virtue of the grant funding requirements and, in Montana's case, state law. The following is an example of Montana's requirement under Title 10 Chapter 3 Part 105. "The plan and program must be coordinated with the disaster and emergency plans and programs of the federal government, other states, political subdivisions, and Canada to the fullest extent possible."¹³

The establishment of a coordinated and integrated capabilities framework is necessary to ensure the appropriate capacities across the country are in place. The framework must ensure that all elements are integrated to account for cause and effect impacts to the outcome. The development should be a grass roots approach applying an all-hazard methodology to achieve the highest probability of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial coordination. This effort will require considering all current federal directives and initiatives, standard development issues and developing the appropriate development methodology integrating current CBP research and industry practices. Enumerated below, are the most prominent areas for consideration.

- The foundation terminology must be clearly defined and applied consistently. The current terminology is used interchangeably between federal documents and is not applied consistently among capability efforts. The development of this element will require the integration of the HSPD 8 focus aligned with current principles to establish a clear and understandable terminology foundation and the intent of the desired outcome.
- The architecture for the capability product must be appropriately established to provide direction toward achieving the intended outcome. The current architecture has capabilities targeted to specific mission area taxonomy: prevent, protect, respond, and recover. This approach is not an appropriate application because capabilities do not specifically reside within one mission area. As an example, the coordination center

¹³ State of Montana, *Montana Code Annotated* (Helena, MT: Montana Legislative Services, 2005), Title 10 – Chapter 3-Part 105.

capability is one that is a common element necessary for every hazard. It is not specific to just the response mission area as alluded to in the current TCL. The main component of HSPD 5 is the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS system speaks to the appropriateness of strategic and tactical capabilities varying from the current capability taxonomy approach. Firescope is a document used in California. “The content of the Field Operations Guide (FOG) is intended to provide guidance for the application of the Incident Command System (ICS) to any planned or unplanned event.”¹⁴ Research of the Firescope ICS operational guidelines will be necessary to identify any parameters not currently considered. This effort will require a thorough review of the TCL and integration of HSPD 5, both complimentary to HSPD 8.

- The capability development methodology will need to be carefully crafted to identify gaps in the current system and alignment with the new architecture. The current CBP and EBP processes are used infrequently and new to government application, except for the military discipline. The current DHS CBP methodology is flawed for several reasons:
 - The foundation for CBP development is scenario centric in contradiction to the philosophy prescribed by HSPD 8, an all-hazard methodology. The primary principle behind the terrorism focus relies on the fact that state, local, tribal and territorial capabilities will be overwhelmed and that is not always the case.
 - The UTL is developed through a mission area analysis. The result of the mission area analysis for tasks confuses the issue as the results include capabilities and tasks.
 - Capabilities are a product of a compendium of some 1600 tasks formulated under the UTL. The tasks were not developed in reference to capability parameters. This approach is the reversal of what should be done to define tasks based on the defined capability.

The approach to development must begin with a global emphasis and an all-hazard methodology to meet the true intent of HSPD 8 and identify all possible capabilities. The capabilities can then be further refined by applying the specific threat analysis already identified by federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government. This application approach is necessary because it cannot be assumed that all jurisdictions face the same threats. An overlay of jurisdictional threats in correlation to the global

¹⁴ California Office of Emergency Services, *Firescope – Field Operations Guide ICS 420-1* (CA: Government Printing Office, 2007), <http://www.firescope.org/ics-8x11-fog.htm> (accessed June 25, 2007), 3.

capability elements is a necessary deductive approach to identify any jurisdiction threat specific adjustments. These specifics will set the parameters for appropriate capability task development. The development methodology will require an analytical element. The primary focus of capability assistance is based on a tiered approach. When local or tribal capabilities are overwhelmed, they turn to the state for assistance. Likewise, when state and territorial capabilities are overwhelmed, assistance is requested from the federal government. It is not a given that all federal, state, local, tribal and territorial entities will identify the same capabilities. Capability similarities among the various levels of government must be identified to promote development consistency providing some notion of like outcomes during implementation. The second component of analysis will require identification of implementation thresholds for each capability at the various levels to promote an efficient tiered implementation. Knowing when a given capacity has the tendency to be overwhelmed is a necessary preparatory tool for the next level of government expected to provide additional assistance. Preparing capability implementation as a transparent effort between federal, state, local and tribal government enhances efficiency levels in providing the necessary services to deal with incidents, emergencies, or disasters.

Standard setting initiatives need to be coordinated and integrated into the new framework. Currently, there are two development initiatives competing with the HSPD 8 capabilities approach. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a division of DHS, has embarked on one of the competing initiatives to develop capabilities among the emergency management community. This particular initiative employs standards referred to as the *National Fire Protection Association 1600 Elements* instead of the HSPD 8 CBP approach. In another area, DHS has engaged in a standards development initiative with regard to the NIMS. The initiative is setting standards for emergency management development based on parameters or scenarios that are not very synchronous with those of the DHS capabilities project. These initiatives will be discussed in detail in Chapter II. In any case, research will need to be done to determine if there are any other similar initiatives. These types of initiatives must be incorporated

into the capability development process to prevent parallel efforts with competing goals leading to implementation impediments during an incident, emergency, or disaster.

E. APPROACH

HSPD 8 mandated the development of the NPG. The NPG prescribes the development of Target Capabilities and Universal Tasks. The initiative has resulted in the formation of the TCL and the UTL. The TCL is comprised of 37 target capabilities. The UTL is comprised of a multitude of tasks in support of a corresponding capability. These products identify the elements that state, local, tribal, and territorial entities are to adhere to in the development of their capabilities.

The thesis research regarding “Improving the Current DHS Capabilities Framework” focuses on the current TCL and UTL system implementation at the state, local, tribal, and territorial level. The approach to this issue is formative in nature. Formative approaches include efforts targeted toward identifying the positive and negative attributes of the current system. The intended outcome is to develop a product that will serve to enhance policy guidance. This type of approach is generally qualitative; however, the research also captures quantitative results through a survey. A portion of the research includes a general survey using Zoomerang. The purpose of the survey was to validate identified inconsistencies; ascertain the level of understanding and involvement of the state, local, tribal, and territorial officials; identify additional areas of concern; and, provide insight toward framework development.

It is important to reach the community that is responsible for implementing the federal directives and establishing capabilities. The survey respondents were state or territorial emergency management directors or homeland security advisors and local or tribal emergency managers. These are the individuals responsible for implementing HSPD 8, NPG and the development of capabilities. The instrument attempted to capture information categorically (state/territorial, local and tribal) to provide for a thorough discipline analysis.

The survey is comprised of various questions providing an opportunity for respondents to explain their reasoning. The instrument captures which community the respondent is associated with and their years of experience. Subsequent questions identify the respondents:

- Involvement in the development of the current effort.
- Level of understanding regarding the current effort.
- Understanding of the current approach.
- Concerns regarding the current capability development system.

The information gathered from this portion of the research foundation information was used to develop a framework that enhances the current capability initiative.

F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

The research identified many inconsistencies in the documents guiding capability development. The outcome reflects on the quality of the guiding documents and the accuracy of the CBP literature. The inconsistencies prove the inadequacy or inappropriateness of the guiding documents. The research affirms the cautions raised by the professional literature and enhances the theory that current CBP applications need to be revisited. The research results provide good reason for pursuing other applicable approaches to developing capabilities including Effects-Based-Planning or Incident Command tactical development.

The findings and recommendations show the inaccuracy of current development. These findings will be beneficial to future research implicating a more global and collaborative approach in developing such efforts. The outcomes also reflect the need for a degree of consistency in applying CBP theories, as the guiding documents are disconnected and confusing. The fact that the CBP approach is currently in question and being revised for other efforts will lead to concentrated efforts to find the appropriate mechanism for development. The benefactors of this research will be the homeland security and emergency management communities. These professionals (directors, planners, and coordinators) at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels of government are the consumers responsible for carrying out the federal directives. The framework

identified in the research is intended to provide consistency to approach and provide a more appropriate mechanism for developing capabilities that meets the needs of the homeland security and emergency management disciplines.

The research will also benefit those in charge of developing and implementing policy, process, and guidance providing a thorough analysis of their current efforts and the guiding principles. The intent of the outcome is to enhance their efforts toward establishing capabilities across the country in a manner that makes sense for those responsible for implementation.

In summary, the research will benefit all those involved in implementing the development of target capabilities. The research will provide both qualitative and quantitative results. These results will help validate any discrepancies or positive attributes of the current DHS Target Capabilities effort and provide insight into the elements for consideration in developing an enhance framework.

G. THESIS FORMAT

The following chapters will guide the reader through the identification, analysis, development of recommendations, and future considerations. The thesis is formatted in a logical progression expanding on the components documented above.

- Chapter II – “The Heart of the Issue.” This chapter incorporates the research necessary to discover the real issues and inconsistencies.
- Chapter III – “Survey and Analysis.” This chapter provides a breakdown and analysis of the nationwide survey information regarding the current CBP initiative. The information is analyzed categorically by jurisdiction and composition to identify the appropriate outcomes.
- Chapter IV – “Proposed Framework.” This chapter expands on the survey results to develop the proposed framework to enhance the current CBP initiative. The material identifies a logical approach to developing the initiative and discusses the implementation pros and cons. The chapter also provides a graphic of the proposed framework.
- Chapter V – “The Road Ahead.” This chapter discovers and suggests some of the most prominent elements that will need to be considered if the proposed framework is adopted. These “futures” are critical keys to the success of the enhanced framework.

- Chapter VI – “Conclusion.” The last segment provides a summary with regard to this thesis.
- Appendices – This information supports the thesis and is not necessary for the body of the document, but is pertinent to help develop a more complete understanding of the subject or approach. Appendix C includes a list of acronyms for the reader’s reference.

The next chapter, “The Heart of the Issue,” attempts to expand on the incongruities and inconsistencies discovered during the research phase of the thesis development. The content of the chapter is intended to provide a contextual framework of the issue in a global sense identifying the cause and effect relationships of important elements.

II. THE HEART OF THE ISSUE

The goal of this chapter is establish an understanding of the current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) capabilities initiative. The material will discuss the foundation elements that have a cause-effect relationship with regard to the initiative. The intent of the material is to share the discoveries uncovered during the development of this thesis. The chapter will cover an overview of the subject and include federal directives and initiatives, federal approaches, standard setting issues and state considerations. To start the journey, let us begin with the overview material.

A. OVERVIEW

“A capability provides the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from the performance of one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and performance standards.”¹⁵ Following its formation in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, DHS embarked on a mission to develop initiatives to assist tribal and territorial government to deal with incidents, emergencies, or disasters. The basis of the approach is founded on the ability to deal with any event regardless of the severity or cause - terrorism, man-made or natural - a methodology known as the all-hazard approach. In keeping with this approach, DHS developed a preparedness effort known as the Target Capability List (TCL) development initiative.¹⁶ The strategic preparedness capabilities (planning, training and exercising) called for in this initiative is used to develop subsequent functional capabilities to support areas such as emergency management, law enforcement, emergency response, public health and others. These functional capabilities are the foundation elements implemented by the appropriate level of government to prevent the occurrence of, protect against, response to, and recover from all-hazards in a consistent and effective manner.

¹⁵ Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Goal* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), <https://www.llis.gov> (accessed June 12, 2007), 17.

¹⁶ Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Guidance: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm> (accessed June 8, 2007), iii.

On December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8). HSPD 8 and the supporting National Preparedness Goal (NPG) are the parent documents the federal government follows for directing the development of capabilities embracing the all-hazard approach. A separate federal partnership initiative, however, is coordinating a similar effort that also results in capability development. This initiative began with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is now a subordinate agency to DHS. “In 1996, FEMA was charged by the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations to develop national performance criteria to measure the capability of the States to perform the emergency management functions of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.”¹⁷ “In partnership with the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), FEMA developed the State Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR).”¹⁸ “The success of this effort is evidenced by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) using CAR as a basis for the development of national emergency management standards (National Fire Protection Association – 1600) and using CAR as the foundation for NEMA’s Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) now under development.”¹⁹ “The EMAP is a voluntary accreditation program based on collaboratively developed national standards for state and local emergency management programs which are focused on preventing, preparing for, mitigating against, and coordinating the response and recovery from all hazards—natural or man-made.”²⁰ The EMAP initiative is based on “15 program elements and 58 activities.”²¹ The EMAP standards are not synchronous with those established for the

¹⁷ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Report to the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations – State Capability Assessment for Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), i.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, i.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Homeland Security Institute, *Comparison of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) and the Pilot Capability Assessment (PCA) Project* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), 5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

capabilities covered under the TCL initiative. In fact, the EMAP crosswalk with the TCL identifies that 15 of the 37 capabilities are not addressed. The remainder are addressed or partially addressed.²² The TCL is based on 37 capabilities.

Consequently, we have two non-synchronous programs guiding the development of emergency management capabilities creating a lack of clarity. This circumstance creates a multi-faceted and uncoordinated approach for capability development. The situation makes it difficult for state, local, and tribal government to complete effective capability development efforts. Developing and implementing the right capabilities or knowing when you have exceeded your ability to perform will determine the effectiveness and efficiency of a jurisdiction's ability to deal with incidents, emergencies, or disasters. State, local, and tribal governments rely on the guiding documents to conduct their capability development. It is critical that the federal guidance and direction be consistent with other federal partnership initiatives to prevent duplication and misdirected efforts among all levels of government. The following federal directives and initiatives will attempt to highlight the reasoning behind the inconsistent approach.

B. FEDERAL DIRECTIVES AND INITIATIVES

The DHS is responsible for the implementation of the various federal Homeland Security initiatives. HSPD 8 provides guidance for the development of capabilities to strengthen federal, state, local and tribal preparedness. Based on the organizational structure, one would presume the effort was well coordinated. Outlined below are examples of the incongruities discovered that indicate the presumption is not correct.

- HSPD 8 establishes the NPG to achieve its' result. "This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal."²³ The initiative creates a list of 37 target

²² Nicole Ishmael, *EMAP Standard and National Plans Review* (Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, 2007), 8 – 13.

²³ President, *Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 8* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html> (accessed June 12, 2007), 1.

capabilities, TCL. These elements were developed using a Capabilities-Based-Planning (CBP) approach utilizing 15 scenarios as the foundation for their establishment. The focus here is only directed toward prevention and response.

- The National Response Plan (NRP) is a derivative of HSPD 8. It is the national framework for response. Capabilities are grouped into Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Not all of the ESFs are capabilities based as defined in HSPD 8, for example, energy and external affairs. The NRP is the federal planning document responsible for drawing together all of the elements in a coordinated fashion. “Together, the NRP and the NIMS (published March 1, 2004) integrate the capabilities and resources of various governmental jurisdictions...into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless national framework for domestic incident management.”²⁴ “The NRP applies a functional approach that groups the capabilities of federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross into ESFs.”²⁵ Four of the 15 ESF groupings do not align with the elements of the TCL: transportation, public works & engineering, energy, and external affairs. The NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS) issue is not congruous with the NPG creating another example of inconsistent capability integration for the states to figure out. The NRP has now changed its nomenclature, through its 2007 revision, to the National Response Framework (NRF).²⁶

In view of the fact that the TCL and EMAP efforts exist, separate capability assessment initiatives have surfaced. This duplication adds another level of complexity and potential confusion to the national preparedness capability initiative. Both efforts are implemented by the emergency management community in an effort to establish state and local capabilities. The propensity for confusion exists because one effort is driven by DHS and the other by its subordinate agency FEMA. The following will provide some background for each initiative highlighting the concerns.

- The first standard assessment initiative, Pilot Capability Assessment (PCA) is led by the DHS. “The PCA project was initiated to satisfy legislative and executive branch requirements outlined in HSPD-8. That methodology was to focus on assessing national capabilities measured

²⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/committees/editorial_0566.shtm (accessed June 8, 2007), 19.

²⁵ Ibid., 29.

²⁶ Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008), <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf> (accessed January 28, 2008), 59.

against the Target Capabilities List.”²⁷ The PCA effort is focused on assessing the TCLs with respect to the program mission areas: prevention, protection, response, and recovery.

- The second initiative is a partnership between FEMA and NEMA with respect to the EMAP program. “Launched earlier this year by FEMA in cooperation with EMAP and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), the assessment project is designed to provide information about emergency management and response and preparedness capabilities at the state level so that strengths and weaknesses can be identified and addressed, future progress can be evaluated against a known baseline, and to help target assistance to areas of greatest need.”²⁸ “The evaluation of a state's emergency management system is based on the EMAP Standard, which covers 14 emergency management functional areas drawn from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management.”²⁹ This accreditation effort is focused on assessing capabilities at the state and local level. The standards for the capability assessment are not developed according to the foundation principles of HSPD 8, TCL or the 15 planning scenarios. These efforts are emergency management function related: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. This capability review is not based on the TCL. It is based on an entirely separate set of standards.
- The application of the TCL and EMAP assessments is not consistent within the various grant programs. Specifically referencing the Emergency Management Grant Program (EMPG) and the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), “EMAP is discussed in each program; the Pilot Capability Assessment is not. As each program is focused on different objectives and outcomes, DHS officials should strive to clear up any possibility of conflict between the two grant programs as they relate to EMAP and the PCA.”³⁰

The result is two separate assessment programs structured to improve capabilities at the state, local, tribal, and territorial level. Thus, there are duplicate efforts to

²⁷ Homeland Security Institute, *Comparison of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) and the Pilot Capability Assessment (PCA) Project* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), 3.

²⁸ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Release # HA-03-NEMBCAP* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), <http://www.fema.gov/news/release.fema?id-3712> (accessed June 11, 2007). 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁰ Homeland Security Institute, *Comparison of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) and the Pilot Capability Assessment (PCA) Project* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), 1.

accomplish the same goal but founded on a separate set of standards. The lack of consistency and integration for the same initiative is another example of an incongruity affecting capability development.

- Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) complements HSPD 8 supporting the NPG. It establishes the principles for the development of the NIMS component. The HSPD 5 initiative focuses the development of capabilities on a separate set of 11 scenarios compared to the 15 used under HSPD 8 direction or the NPG. This initiative only addresses two of the elements listed on the TCL: on-site and emergency operations center management. The HSPD 5 scenarios match only 5 of the 15 listed under the TCL or HSPD 8: hurricane, earthquake, hazardous materials, and nuclear. As referenced in the “Standard Setting Consideration” section of this chapter, the DHS Science and Technology division contract with Pacific National Laboratories (PNL) to establish the standards for the NIMS initiative. This entire situation creates another set of inconsistencies in criteria for capability development at the federal level and the application at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels.
- Among the published guidance documents, the terminology becomes interchangeable and initiative purposes become unclear. The 2005 HSPD 8 guidance states: “The Target Capabilities List (TCL) is a set of thirty-six essential capabilities that should be developed and maintained, in whole or in part, by various levels of government to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and major disasters.”³¹ Contrary to the 2005 guidance, DHS 2007 guidance establishes the capabilities as response centric: “The Target Capabilities List (TCL), which defines 37 specific capabilities that communities, the private sector, and all levels of government should collectively possess in order to respond effectively to disasters.”³² Further confusion is generated when the guidance references that the tasks for the TCLs facilitate efforts to deal with incidents, emergencies, or disasters. In reality, these tasks are the support to developing capabilities.
- Tasks are the essential ingredients to a capability based on the NPG definition. The 2007 DHS guidance confuses the issue even further as it leads a reader to believe that the tasks are responsible for achieving the full capabilities focus expressed in the 2005 guidance. “The Universal Task List (UTL), which is a menu of some 1,600 unique tasks that can

³¹ Department of Homeland Security, *Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness Guidance* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm> (accessed June 8, 2007), 3.

³² Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Guidelines* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf (accessed September 23, 2007), 3.

facilitate efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the major events that are represented by the National Planning Scenarios.”³³ The real intent of the tasks is to support the development of capabilities.

All of these documents are very prominent and their substance completely valid. The strength of these documents lies in the fact that they prescribe to a need for capability development and their approach seems very logical. The weakness among all the documents is evidenced by the fact that they do not entirely follow the foundation element, HSPD 8, in developing capabilities. This incongruity creates a contradictory approach by the entity leading the development, the federal government. The salient point is that two of the seven national priorities are not synchronous with the HSPD 8 and NPG initiatives. The result is a lack of consistency and coordination in the approach to developing capabilities. These incongruities also cause one to question the validity of grant guidance toward applying funding parameters consistently. The unknown piece is the reason behind the lack of coordination between the various initiatives.

C. FEDERAL APPROACHES

Homeland Security Advisors and State Emergency Management Directors have been cautioning the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the need to collaborate. DHS routinely develops an initiative with a contractor or among the federal agencies. The product is then sent to the state, local and tribal partners in consultation to verify the appropriateness and quality. This process creates a real dilemma. The “verifiers” are the majority of the stakeholders responsible for adhering to and implementing the initiatives. Asking for their expertise at the end of the assembly line, instead of at the beginning, impedes progress because the reality check always finds gaps in the proposal that could have been avoided. According to Albert Ashwood, the development of the new NRF is a prime example of true collaboration that acquiesced back to the normal verification process. State Emergency Management Directors devoted hours of their time collaborating with the DHS to revise the existing NRP. After nine months, the NRP process stopped. The entire document was rewritten by the DHS without any stakeholder

³³ Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Guidelines*, 3.

collaboration. The new document was titled the NRF and changed considerably compared to the original NRP effort. Once again, stakeholders were asked to verify the product. The original comment period was extremely short and finally extended. Bottom line is that the stakeholders generated thousands of comments or remarks that needed adjudication by the department.³⁴ A potential underlying issue resides with the foundation documents themselves. There are two incongruities. First, the authorship of the main documents is not consistent. The directive documents, HSPD 8 and HSPD 5 are formulated by the same entity (Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) establishing the foundation requirements. According to a DHS official, the authors of the primary supporting documents vary:

- NRP – DHS Office of Secretary.
- National Preparedness Guidelines (TCL/UTL) – DHS Grant and Training.
- National Incident Management System (NIMS) – DHS Office of Secretary (FEMA – original lead; later completed by another entity in DHS).³⁵

In view of the incongruities identified earlier in the chapter, this inconsistency draws suspicion to the clarity and common understanding of the goals and objectives between and among the authors to achieve integration of the various components. Secondly, the HSPD 8 guidance directs the focus of the DHS efforts away from true cooperation or collaboration substituting the element of consultation among all the implementing stakeholders: federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government. According to HSPD 8, “The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, and, in consultation with State and local governments, shall develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.”³⁶ The NPG creates the same dilemma when it states, “Development of the Goal and the planning tools involved extensive coordination with other Federal departments and agencies and consultation with State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector,

³⁴ Albert Ashwood (Past President: National Emergency Management Association & Director: Oklahoma Emergency Management), interview by author, Helena, MT, August 18, 2008.

³⁵ David Kaufman (Department of Homeland Security: Director of Preparedness Policy, Planning & Analysis Division), interview by author, Washington, D.C., October 4, 2007.

³⁶ President, *Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 8* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html> (accessed June 12, 2007), 1.

and non-governmental organizations.”³⁷ In her research, Dr. Sharon Caudle puts focus to the true disconnect that DHS relied on consultants to develop initiatives. The DHS not only relied on consultants, but they traded true partnership and collaboration among all the stakeholders for consultation.³⁸

The lack of action to create a comprehensive collaborative approach will continue the proliferation of duplicative efforts between many organizations and uncoordinated national efforts. Several organizations have a consultative influence on the development of DHS initiatives. The HSAC provides the primary guidance. FEMA organizes two separate initiatives to review duplicative initiatives. Nationally, they have formed the National Advisory Council. Regionally, they established Regional Advisory Councils in each of the ten regions and a Regional Interagency Steering Committee. All of these initiatives deal with the development of homeland security and emergency management issues. NEMA membership is primarily comprised of state and territorial emergency management directors. The association has formed a consortium of key stakeholders, to include Homeland Security Advisors to weigh in on DHS initiatives. The National Governor’s Association (NGA) has formed the Governor’s Homeland Security Advisory Council (GHSAC) to provide input. Last, but not least, the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) provides input to the process. Except for the HSAC, all of these organizations generally weigh in at the outcome side of the equation instead of the development phase. This process further complicates efficiency in developing cooperative and collaborative initiatives.

D. STANDARD SETTING CONSIDERATIONS

As referenced in the federal initiative section, different standard setting criteria are employed for complementary DHS HSPD 8 initiatives. There are several standard

³⁷ Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Goal* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), <https://www.llis.gov> (accessed June 12, 2007), 5.

³⁸ Sharon L. Caudle, *Homeland Security Capabilities-Based Planning: Lessons from the Defense Community*, Homeland Security Affairs, I, no. 2, (2005), <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.2>, (accessed June 12, 2007), 8.

setting agencies: NFPA, PNL, American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and ASTM International. According to an interview with Nicole Ishmael, Director for EMAP and formerly the Interim Director:

FEMA migrates toward the EMAP standard for their development. The EMAP standard is derived from the NFPA 1600 standards. The DHS National Integration Center (NIC) is responsible for the NIMS standards. The NIC relies on the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) division for the development of those standards. S&T contracts with Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to develop the NIC standards. The Incident Management Standards Working Group (IMSWG) was established under the Standards Area Subject Working group out of Presidential Directive 10602. The IMSWG supports the NIC. Bottom line, the standard setting entities operate in a vacuum and no one brings them together to achieve true collaboration.³⁹

Standards are not approached consistently creating room for inconsistent integration. No one standard fully embodies the complete context of the national directives. Choosing a single standard to follow would be difficult due to the lack of consistency and integration highlighted earlier.

E. STATE CONSIDERATIONS

State law sets the precedent for incorporating federal initiatives into planning efforts in preparing for incidents, emergencies, or disasters. According to Montana Law, *Montana Code Annotated* (MCA) – Title 10, Chapter 3, Part 105, Montana Disaster, and Emergency Services is responsible to “prepare and maintain a comprehensive plan and program for disaster and emergency services of this state. The plan and program must be coordinated with the disaster and emergency plans and programs of the federal government, other states, political subdivisions, and Canada to the fullest extent possible.”⁴⁰ The interpretation is that the state plan must be in concert with the directional planning development prescribed by the federal government. A survey of

³⁹ Nicole Ishmael (Interim Director, Emergency Management Accreditation Program), phone interview with author, Helena, MT, June 4, 2007.

⁴⁰ State of Montana, *Montana Code Annotated* (Helena, MT: Montana Legislative Services, 2005), Title 10 – Chapter 3-Part 105.

state and territorial emergency management directors indicated that similar requirements exist across the country. Of the thirty state and territorial respondents, 60 percent or 30 or the 50 jurisdictions have the same requirement as Montana.

The SHSGP application requires that the state justify their funding application through an enhancement plan. The enhancement plan requires the state to relate strategies or work elements to one of the TCLs' 37 target capabilities under the NPG. In contrast, the HSPD 5 and NIMS initiative prescribes a slightly different set of capabilities and requires "Adoption of the NIMS by State and local organizations a condition for Federal preparedness assistance (through grants, contracts, and other activities) beginning in FY2005."⁴¹ This requirement makes NIMS adoption and the development of its defined capabilities a requirement to receive SHSGP funding. It is hard to determine which precedent for funding is priority. It is very difficult to meet funding requirements that are based on a separate set of criteria for the same initiative: HSPD 8 and the NPG.

The states, through grant guidance or state law, are required to follow the federal principles for developing capabilities. Based on the situations enumerated above, state governments find themselves following several different federal approaches toward developing capabilities. The consequences of trying to follow each approach results in duplication of effort and misguided development due to the lack of coordination among the federal guiding documents. Consequently, the funding that is used for these initiatives follows the development efforts and results in duplicative or unnecessary expenditures. State general fund budgeting and agency fiduciary responsibility does not provide much flexibility for adjusting to fund uncoordinated efforts.

Another dilemma is created by the fact that DHS grant funding availability is diminishing creating an even larger problem toward the achievement of developing sustainable capabilities. States simply cannot afford to allocate their time, personnel, and financial resources on uncoordinated efforts; such action is not being responsible in a managerial or fiduciary capacity. Without consistent funding, sustainability and coordinated development, program implementation is bound to produce inefficiencies.

⁴¹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *NIMS Basic Introduction and Overview* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), www.fema.gov (accessed June 8, 2007), 2.

These inefficiencies could be critical factors in providing assistance during an exigent situation. Any deficiencies can ultimately cost the unnecessary loss of lives and property.

F. SUMMARY

The incongruities have created confusion within and among the initiatives regarding the intended outcome; there is not an accepted standardized approach. Instead of developing robust and flexible capabilities, the system has created a great deal of divergence. A composite and collaborative approach could be engineered not focusing on specific hazards, yet ensuring all-hazard influences were accommodated. A major component of this effort involves integrating the most applicable elements of current initiatives: HSPD 8, TCL, UTL, HSPD 5, NRF, and the standard setting documents. The approach must also consider all internal and external influences toward developing capabilities.

The nation's response to incidents, emergencies, or disasters must be coordinated between and among all levels of government. Based on the author's 17 years of emergency management experience, if nothing is done to correct the current incongruities and uncoordinated approaches, the failures experienced in the Katrina response will potentially continue to resurface until corrective action has been completed. Taking proactive action to develop a national capability system between the stakeholders among all levels of government will maximize efficiencies. Such an effort will prevent wasteful spending, duplication of effort and maximize the use of critical or short resource inventories. A collaborative effort will ensure continuity of approach, consistency in operations, clarity regarding authority and provide effective mechanisms to protect the citizenry and property affected.

Elected officials in federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government are ultimately responsible to ensure systems and mechanisms are in place to protect the citizens and property from incidents, emergencies, or disasters. The events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina magnified the need to have a unified response. The only way to achieve a unified response is to build a national system that is developed by the stakeholders that are responsible for managing and responding to such incidents. A

unified system cannot be developed through disconnected approaches by various organizations and directives to achieve such a goal and develop pertinent capabilities. The lack of a proactive approach will cause deterioration of trust for government and impede the important preparedness and response efforts that require critical citizen participation.

The following chapter discovers the level of understanding regarding the current CBP initiative. The chapter involves the analysis of the subject matter using the results of a nationwide survey. The survey results are captured categorically: state/territorial, local and tribal. The data compartmentalization allows for a thorough jurisdictional analysis.

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III. SURVEY AND ANALYSIS

A nationwide survey comprised of 14 questions was conducted to ascertain the level of understanding with regard to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Capability-Based-Planning (CBP) initiative to develop target capabilities. The primary focus of the survey set out to determine the level of understanding, involvement and implementation regarding the DHS capabilities framework among state/territorial, local and tribal homeland security and emergency management professionals. The secondary purpose of the survey focused on determining the applicability among state/territorial, local, and tribal jurisdictions regarding the 15 scenarios used to develop the Target Capabilities. Ultimately, the survey structure allowed the identification of potential elements that would enhance the current CBP initiative.

The survey was distributed to the homeland security and emergency management community among the state/territorial, local, and tribal sectors and 185 respondents completed the survey among the three discipline areas. The survey was formatted to obtain both qualitative and quantitative results. Respondents were given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter. The following positive comments were received with regard to the CBP initiative:

- DHS has provided adequate material.
- It is appropriate for DHS to provide a reference point to guide state and local jurisdiction activities.
- It seems to be a very detailed and excellent document.
- It is a much needed and long overdue effort to standardize capability assessment.
- Excellent foundation, guidelines, and resource.
- The Target Capabilities List (TCL) clearly defines the capabilities to achieve levels of preparedness.

The number of negative comments outweighed the positive comments; however, the constructive content of the comment held the gems of information. The constructive nature of the comments provided a great deal of insight. These insights and the survey results captured the identification of the elements that state/territorial, local, and tribal

homeland security and emergency management professionals felt were applicable toward enhancing the current CBP initiative. This chapter provides an overview of the survey approach, the results, and respective analysis and concludes with a summary of the identified applicable elements.

A. APPROACH

It is important to reach the community that is responsible for implementing the federal directives and establishing capabilities to determine its effectiveness. The survey involves respondents from state or territorial emergency management, state homeland security advisors, tribal emergency management, and local jurisdictions. Zoomerang technology was used to conduct a nationwide survey categorizing jurisdictional responses. The respondents were accessed directly or through their respective associations: National Emergency Management Association, National Governor's Association and the International Association of Emergency Managers. The data was captured in three separate files to provide an analysis capability of the distinct disciplines: state/territorial, tribal and local. The value of the architecture allowed for independent and aggregate analysis to depict any distinct differences or similarities and yield a composite result.

The structure of the survey provided the opportunity to conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis. The survey included a series of questions with the opportunity to provide a "yes" or "no" answer to satisfy the quantitative desire. Each question included a comment section to provide for a qualitative analysis opportunity. In an effort to fulfill the primary purpose of the survey, the data analysis focused on organizing the questions and their respective comments as they pertained to the four critical areas of concentration: understandable approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level of collaboration.

The scenario section design allowed the analysis to compare the applicability of the 15 DHS scripted scenarios with other historically identified events. The survey identified 24 scenarios, with one category called "other" as a placeholder for non-

identified events. The Target Capabilities' scenarios accounted for 62.5% of the events, while the additional categories represented 37.5% of the possible selections. Participants identified the scenarios that were the most prominent in their jurisdiction.

The raw data is captured in a spreadsheet format. Due to the nature of the survey confidentiality, the raw data is not included in this document. A sanitized composite summary of the results and comments in a spreadsheet format was developed. The spreadsheet is void of all references to respondents, any direct reference that may implicate agency personnel and comments are summarized reflecting the general nature of the respondents' input. The information used in the body of this document is a summary of the composite information.

B. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The survey results are divided into discipline specific sections: local, state/territorial and tribal. A fourth section represents an aggregate of all the discipline survey information. Immediately following each section is an analysis of the information. The result sections include a breakdown of respondents' experience, a table of survey data sorted by the coding areas of concentration referencing the pertinent survey questions and a graph depicting the most applicable scenarios for the discipline. The table of survey data includes a positive column reflecting the percent of "yes" answers to the question and a negative column depicting the percent of "no" answers to the question. The comments are summarized from the composite summary referenced above.

1. Local Results

The local respondents submitting a survey totaled 122. Their years of experience in emergency management or homeland security are depicted in the following table.

Table 1. Local Respondents Years of Experience in Emergency Management or Homeland Security

YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	# RESPONDENTS	% OF TOTAL
0-5	33	27%
6-10	30	25%
11-15	15	12%
16-20	20	16%
21 & above	24	20%

The local survey results are depicted in Table 2. Comment summaries are not necessarily reflective of a “yes” or “no” response. The comment summaries are reflective of the constructive criticisms that provide insight to enhancing the current CBP initiative. The table structure is focused on organizing the questions and their respective comments as they pertained to the four critical areas of concentration: understandable approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level of collaboration. The table is sorted by area of concentration referencing the applicable question.

Table 2. Local Survey Results

LOCAL SURVEY RESULTS					
QUESTION #	SURVEY QUESTION	(122 Respondents)		COMMENT SUMMARY	CONCENTRATION
		POS	NEG		
2	Do you agree with the Department of Homeland Security approach to capability development?	52%	48%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DHS does not have a firm understanding of local issues. ▪ Initiative needs a bottoms-up, be inclusive and include local input. 	APPROACH
6	Please explain your agency's approach to capability development in the comment box below			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Initiative depicted as needing a sense of realism. ▪ Majority of local approaches were based on jurisdiction risk and threats developed through Hazard Vulnerability Analysis. ▪ Other local approaches were based on NIMS, ESFs, functional concentration or public health capabilities. ▪ Strongly noted that limited funding was an impeding factor to achieving any progress. 	APPROACH
8	Do you feel there is a better approach to developing capabilities?	60%	40%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Need a bottoms-up approach successfully meeting mission challenges with consistent oversight and benchmarks. ▪ Need to establish a goal and a framework that is scalable identifying gaps with a blend between standards and performance integrating all doctrines 	APPROACH
12	Do you have any comments about the federal guidance regarding capabilities?			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Comments varied from "haven't seen guidance" to "unrealistic or too complex and ambiguous." ▪ Additional comments that it "seems we are moving in the right direction." ▪ Identified that focus needs to involve input from all local entities to include volunteers. 	APPROACH

LOCAL SURVEY RESULTS					
QUESTION #	SURVEY QUESTION	(122 Respondents)		COMMENT SUMMARY	CONCENTRATION
1	Do you understand the Department of Homeland Security approach to developing capabilities?	76%	24%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Not a clue or very limited understanding to understand fully.▪ Positive responses questionable in lieu of descriptive terms like "seems okay," "mostly" and "capabilities beyond our ability."	CLARITY
5	Do you understand the interdependencies between the Target Capabilities List and the Universal Task List?	66%	34%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Indicate the effort is too complicated.▪ Summarily little understanding with descriptive statements like "I think so philosophically" and "barely understand."	CLARITY
10	Were you a member of any Department of Homeland Security committee engaged in the Capability development effort?	4%	96%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Unequivocally very limited local input.	COLLABORATION
11	Were you consulted, at any time, regarding the Capability development effort?	15%	85%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Limited consultation only.▪ Effort perceived as too federally focused with little regard for concerted local inputs in exchange for an internal DHS approach with no objectivity.	COLLABORATION
3	Does your agency use the Target Capabilities List to identify the capabilities it needs to develop?	57%	43%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Limited use as an assessment tool.▪ Some use as a reference.▪ Most use because tied to grant dollars and requirements.	VALUE
4	Does your agency use the Universal Task List to identify the tasks it needs to consider for capability development?	48%	52%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Cannot find them on the web to use as a reference.▪ Use because of grant requirements.	VALUE
7	Please explain why your agency uses the approach described in number 6 in the comment box below			<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Approach was understandable.▪ Made sense from a historical and realistic perspective.▪ Our approach was tailored to jurisdiction needs with budget limiting considerations.	VALUE

The following chart depicts the applicable scenarios identified by local survey respondents with respect to their jurisdictional hazard and threats. Survey respondents were able to choose the hazards or threats that were most applicable to their area. The chart identifies the scenarios listed in the survey and captures the number of respondents that chose each scenario.




Chart 1. Scenario Applicability to Local Jurisdictions

2. Local Analysis

The respondents represented each categorical level of experience. Only 27% of the respondents were new to the discipline after 9/11. The majority of the respondents, 73%, were members of their profession at the time of 9/11 or before. Almost one-half of the respondents, 48%, have 11 or more years of experience. The respondents represented a good cross section of experience levels for the survey with a significant portion being seasoned professionals. The survey results do not represent a generalization of the local disciplines nationwide. “Generalizations require a survey response from 50% or more of the respondent population.”⁴² Because Montana alone has 56 emergency management professionals, the generalization qualification is not satisfied with a nationwide respondent sample of 122. The responses, however, can be targeted as a nationwide indicator for the local discipline. The information captured and categorized by area of concentration is as follows:

- **Approach** – respondents were split (52% vs. 48%) with regard to agreeing with the DHS TCL initiative. Most of the respondents (60%) felt that there is a better approach to capabilities. Comments indicated that DHS did not have an understanding of local issues. Current local approaches varied among a variety of guiding elements: hazard vulnerability analysis, Emergency Support Functions or National Incident Management System (NIMS). The respondents felt the initiative should involve more of a bottoms-up or grass roots all-hazard approach. The targeted elements needed to focus on a scalable framework with established goals, gaps, and benchmarks blending standards and performance. The comments depicted a sense of irrelevancy in the current approach by references to too complex, too terrorism centric, focused on federal emphasis instead of state and local, no consensus on resultant outcome, need to determine acceptable risk, need to focus on preparedness and not being able to meet criteria.
- **Clarity** – respondents indicated a better than average understanding of the DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL) and Universal Task List (UTL) interdependencies, 76% and 66% positive responses respectively. These percentages are questionable as comments used to qualify the answers included ambiguous terms such as, “seems okay,” “I think so,” “barely understand” and “I think so philosophically.”

⁴² William Pelfrey (Academic Associate, Naval Postgraduate School), interview with author, Monterey, CA, April 11, 2008.

- **Collaboration** – responses indicated there was virtually no collaboration, only consultation, with any local disciplines during development of the DHS Target Capabilities initiative. Local input was disregarded and replaced by internal DHS non-objective based efforts.
- **Value** – respondents were split with regard to either the TCL or UTL efforts. Both efforts were referenced as guides and not accepted practices. The local disciplines valued initiatives that were more realistic, based on historical perspective and tailored to jurisdictional needs. Some irrelevancy in value was noted by comments that the current efforts were not commensurate with current industry standards like the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) or were too heavily reliant on large department abilities.

Local respondents indicated in the survey that the Target Capabilities initiative was too terrorism focused and development should be based on what is pertinent to the jurisdiction. The chart section indicates that respondents find non-terrorism related scenarios to be more prominent for their jurisdictions. The 122 respondents identified 1022 scenarios pertinent to their respective jurisdictions. While the terrorism scenarios account for almost two-thirds of the available choices in the survey, terrorism events only accounted for 54.7% of the selections. The non-terrorism related scenarios accounted for 43.3% of the selections. The chart identifies Pandemic Influenza, Wild land Fire, Flood, Winter Storm, and Tornado as the top five choices. These selections validate the respondent comments regarding the “too terrorism focused” concern as 80% or 4 out of the 5 top choices are naturally occurring events that were not considered in the DHS capability development model. If DHS were to have chosen the top 15 scenarios most likely of concern to local jurisdictions, the list in ranked order would appear as follows (** indicates scenario as one of the 15 DHS scenarios):

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------|-----|
| • Flood | 81% |
| • Winter Storm | 73% |
| • Pandemic Influenza** | 57% |
| • Wild land Fire | 55% |
| • Tornado | 52% |
| • Explosive Attack – Improvised Explosive Device** | 44% |
| • Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion ** | 41% |
| • Major Earthquake** | 41% |

- Cyber Attack** 39%
- Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals** 37%
- Dam Failure 34%
- Major Hurricane** 34%
- Biological Attack – Food Contamination** 33%
- Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease** 29%
- Other 28%

(Other included hazmat, severe wind, crop disease, drought, shooting, nuclear power plant incident, avalanche, mudslide, civil disturbance, extreme heat)

Only nine of these events (denoted by: **) are parts of original DHS 15 scripted scenarios for the capabilities initiative.

3. State/Territorial Results

The state/territorial respondents submitting a survey totaled 57. Their years of experience in emergency management or homeland security are depicted in the following table.

Table 3. State/Territorial Respondents Years of Experience in Emergency Management or Homeland Security

YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	# RESPONDENTS	% OF TOTAL
0-5	11	19%
6-10	11	19%
11-15	9	16%
16-20	7	12%
21 and above	19	33%

The state/territorial survey results are depicted in the following table. Comment summaries are not necessarily reflective of a yes or no response. The comment summaries are reflective of the constructive criticisms that provide insight to enhancing the current CBP initiative. The table structure is focused on organizing the questions and their respective comments as they pertained to the four critical areas of concentration:

understandable approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level of collaboration. The table is sorted by area of concentration referencing the applicable question.

Table 4. State/Territorial Survey Results

STATE/TERRITORIAL SURVEY RESULTS					
QUESTION#	SURVEY QUESTION	STATE (57 Respondents)		COMMENT SUMMARY	CONCENTRATION
		POS	NEG		
2	Do you agree with the Department of Homeland Security approach to capability development?	51%	49%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ "Capability to do what?" ▪ Current development is inconsistent, unmanageable, and too ad hoc and involves inappropriate scenario focus. ▪ Needs to be a bottoms-up approach developed on locally known scenarios and hazards defined by realistic activities and acquisitions to achieve readiness with identified gaps. 	APPROACH
6	Please explain your agency's approach to capability development in the comment box below			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No real consistent approach. The approaches varied between gaps, priorities, hazard vulnerability analysis, priorities set by leadership, and initiatives determined by grant funding. ▪ Need surfaced to identify gaps and commit resources to resolve. 	APPROACH
8	Do you feel there is a better approach to developing capabilities?	58%	42%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Need to use a sustainable integrated systems functional approach based on more of a national discussion. ▪ Need a state strategic focus that is more inclusive. 	APPROACH

STATE/TERRITORIAL SURVEY RESULTS					
QUESTION#	SURVEY QUESTION	STATE (57 Respondents)		COMMENT SUMMARY	CONCENTRATION
		POS	NEG		
12	Do you have any comments about the federal guidance regarding capabilities?			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Driven by fears of least likely events, completely void of state input. Initiative is too long, too detailed, too prescriptive, and lacking measurement. System is more bureaucratic than functional. 	APPROACH
1	Do you understand the Department of Homeland Security approach to developing capabilities?	82%	18%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effort not clearly understood by DHS lacking clarity in approach that is too convoluted and military centric. Initiative flawed by frequent changes in contractors and DHS misdirection. DHS changing focus between capability and task based approach. 	CLARITY
5	Do you understand the interdependencies between the Target Capabilities List and the Universal Task List?	75%	25%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Understand the theory, but too convoluted and impractical. 	CLARITY
10	Were you a member of any Department of Homeland Security committee engaged in the Capability development effort?	12%	88%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No Comments. 	COLLABORATION
11	Were you consulted, at any time, regarding the Capability development effort?	23%	77%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited inclusion with perception that feedback submitted was ignored. 	COLLABORATION
3	Does your agency use the Target Capabilities List to identify the capabilities it needs to develop?	74%	26%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Only use as a guide or building block due to inability to aggregate at state level and lack of federal implementation technical assistance. 	VALUE
4	Does your agency use the Universal Task List to identify the tasks it needs to consider for capability development?	53%	47%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No agreement for utilizing TCLs. The system is excessively cumbersome. 	VALUE

STATE/TERRITORIAL SURVEY RESULTS					
QUESTION#	SURVEY QUESTION	STATE (57 Respondents)		COMMENT SUMMARY	CONCENTRATION
		POS	NEG		
7	Please explain why your agency uses the approach described in number 6 in the comment box below			<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Our approach is understandable and a collaborative grass roots approach involving counties.▪ DHS initiative is non-coordinated and done in a vacuum.	VALUE

The following chart depicts the applicable scenarios identified by state/territorial survey respondents with respect to their jurisdictional hazard and threats. Survey respondents were able to choose the hazards or threats that were most applicable to their area. The chart identifies the scenarios listed in the survey and captures the number of respondents that chose each scenario.




Chart 2. Scenario Applicability to State and Territorial Jurisdictions

4. State/Territorial Analysis

The respondents represented each categorical level of experience. Only 19% of the respondents were new to the discipline after 9/11. The majority of the respondents, 81%, were members of their profession at the time of 9/11 or before. Over one-half of the respondents, 61%, have 11 or more years of experience. The respondents represented a good cross section of experience levels for the survey with a majority being seasoned professionals. The survey results represent a generalization of the state/territorial disciplines nationwide. Generalizations require a survey response from 50% or more of the respondent population. There are 56 state/territorial jurisdictions with an emergency management director and/or homeland security advisor. That combination provides a potential for 112 responses from this community. A comparison of the directors and advisors reveals that 11 individuals hold both positions. This circumstance reduces the potential respondents to 101. The survey results noted 57 respondents equaling 56% of the respondent population indicating the responses can be considered a generalization of the respondent population. The information captured and categorized by area of concentration is as follows:

- **Approach** – respondents were split (51% vs. 49%) with regard to agreeing with the DHS TCL initiative. Most of the respondents (58%) felt that there is a better approach to capabilities. Comments indicated that the DHS approach lacks the use of appropriate scenarios and is void of state input and a manageable consistent framework. The current initiative is characterized as “more bureaucratic than functional driven by fears of least likely events.” Respondents indicated that the approach needs to be more inclusive indicative of a grass roots or bottoms-up type effort founded on known local scenarios and hazards. Current state/territorial approaches varied among a variety of guiding elements: gaps, leadership priorities, hazard vulnerability analysis, and grant funding requirements. The targeted elements need to focus on a national discussion regarding a sustainable and integrated systems based functional approach identifying gaps and the necessary resources. The comments depicted a sense of irrelevancy in the current approach by references to capabilities being abstract, ineffective implementation of an initiative based on homeland security funding prioritization after bulk of grant dollars were spent and non applicable scenarios. The comments also reflected that there was “no clarity in approach,” the current initiative was not a “cookie cutter solution” and what worked in New York does not necessarily work in other jurisdictions.

- **Clarity** – respondents indicated that a majority understood the DHS TCL and UTL interdependencies, 82% and 75% positive responses respectively. The comments, however, indicated a disagreement with the initiative being too convoluted, military centric, impractical, misdirected, and not understood by DHS.
- **Collaboration** – responses indicated there was minimal collaboration or involvement by state/territorial jurisdictions in the development of the Target Capabilities initiative. Only 12% of the respondents were engaged via some form of committee work and 23% were consulted in some manner regarding the initiative. Comments indicated there was limited inclusion and the feedback given to DHS was ignored.
- **Value** – respondents indicated they used the TCL and UTL, 74% and 53% respectively. The comments, however, indicated the directed use is as a guide or building block. There is no consensus for using the TCL as the system as it is “way too cumbersome” and lacks federal implementation assistance. Other approaches are being used that are understandable and collaborative, unlike the “DHS vacuum approach.” Some irrelevancy in value was noted by comments that the current efforts were too confusing not reflective of decisions made at the state level and seen as a “paperwork shuffle.” The number of tasks is seen as totally unmanageable and “the list is so onerous it overwhelms one’s sensibilities to ever process.”

State/territorial respondents indicated in the survey inappropriateness with respect to the scenarios used in the Target Capabilities initiative and should be based on the events and hazards relevant to the jurisdiction. The chart section indicates that respondents find non-terrorism related scenarios to be more prominent for their jurisdictions. The 57 respondents identified 512 scenarios pertinent to their respective jurisdictions. While the terrorism scenarios account for almost two-thirds of the available choices in the survey, terrorism events only accounted for 56.4% of the selections. The non-terrorism related scenarios accounted for 43.6% of the selections. As in the local results, the chart identifies Pandemic Influenza, Wild land Fire, Flood, Winter Storm, and Tornado as the top five choices. These selections validate the respondent comments regarding the “scenario inappropriateness” concern, as 80% or 4 out of the 5 top choices are naturally occurring events that were not considered in the DHS capability development model. If DHS were to have chosen the top 15 scenarios most likely of concern to state/territorial jurisdictions, the list in ranked order would appear as follows (** indicates scenario as one of the 15 DHS scenarios):

- Flood 82%
- Winter Storm 79%
- Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza** 65%
- Wild land Fire 54%
- Tornado 53%
- Cyber Attack** 49%
- Explosive Attack - Improvised Explosive Device** 46%
- Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion** 44%
- Dam Failure 44%
- Major Earthquake** 42%
- Major Hurricane** 40%
- Biological Attack - Food Contamination** 37%
- Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals** 33%
- Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease** 33%
- Other 32%

(Other included hazmat, severe wind, drought, shooting, mudslide)

Only 9 of these events (denoted by: **) are parts of original DHS 15 scripted scenarios for the capabilities initiative.

5. Tribal Results

The tribal respondents submitting a survey totaled six. Their years of experience in emergency management or homeland security are depicted in the following table.

Table 5. Tribal Respondents Years of Experience in Emergency Management or Homeland Security

YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	# RESPONDENTS	% OF TOTAL
0-6	2	33%
6-11	1	17%
11-16	0	0%
16-21	3	50%
22 & above	0	0%

The state/territorial survey results are depicted in the following table. Comment summaries are not necessarily reflective of a yes or no response. The comment summaries are reflective of the constructive criticisms that provide insight to enhancing the current CBP initiative. The table structure is focused on organizing the questions and their respective comments as they pertained to the four critical areas of concentration: understandable approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level of collaboration. The table is sorted by area of concentration referencing the applicable question.

Table 6. Tribal Survey Results

TRIBAL SURVEY RESULTS					
QUESTION #	SURVEY QUESTION	TRIBAL (6 Respondents)		COMMENTS	CONCENTRATION
		P0S	NEG		
2	Do you agree with the Department of Homeland Security approach to capability development?	83%	17%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Skewed approach dating back to Civil Defense days with limited funding and a lack of coordination between federal entities to reduce duplication of effort.	APPROACH
6	Please explain your agency's approach to capability development in the comment box below			<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ No consistent approach.▪ Foundation for development varies in orientation: response centric, mitigation driven, SWOT or HSEEP focus.	APPROACH
8	Do you feel there is a better approach to developing capabilities?	67%	33%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Suggest improved regional approach and trained SMEs from the state to assist.▪ Challenged by education and language barriers.	APPROACH
12	Do you have any comments about the federal guidance regarding capabilities?			<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Lack of financial capability and identification of true Indian Nation needs.▪ Indian Nation direction implemented according to tribal leader direction	APPROACH
1	Do you understand the Department of Homeland Security approach to developing capabilities?	100%	0%	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Conflicting requirements with significant gaps between sovereignties excluding other federal influences on tribal government: BIA, BIE, IHS and EPA	CLARITY

TRIBAL SURVEY RESULTS					
QUESTION #	SURVEY QUESTION	TRIBAL (6 Respondents)		COMMENTS	CONCENTRATION
		POS	NEG		
5	Do you understand the interdependencies between the Target Capabilities List and the Universal Task List?	50%	50%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comments reflect a total lack of understanding of interdependencies, as non-related corollaries are the subject of comments: vulnerable sites, remoteness, and financial resources. 	CLARITY
10	Were you a member of any Department of Homeland Security committee engaged in the Capability development effort?	0%	100%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No Comment. 	COLLABORATION
11	Were you consulted, at any time, regarding the Capability development effort?	0%	100%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No Comment. 	COLLABORATION
3	Does your agency use the Target Capabilities List to identify the capabilities it needs to develop?	67%	33%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited use driven by grant requirements. Use impeded by inapplicable value because of sovereignty issues. 	VALUE
4	Does your agency use the Universal Task List to identify the tasks it needs to consider for capability development?	50%	50%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited use as a guide because focus is on grant driven requirements. 	VALUE
7	Please explain why your agency uses the approach described in number 6 in the comment box below			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No consistent reason; focus varies between National standard, mirroring counties, following Elder direction and need for flexibility 	VALUE

The following chart depicts the applicable scenarios identified by tribal survey respondents with respect to their jurisdictional hazards and threats. Survey respondents were able to choose the hazards or threats that were most applicable to their area. The chart identifies the scenarios listed in the survey and captures the number of respondents that chose each scenario.




Chart 3. Scenario Applicability to Tribal Jurisdictions

6. Tribal Analysis

The respondents represented 4 of the 5 categorical levels of experience. After 9/11, 33% of the respondents were new to the discipline. The majority of the respondents, 67%, were members of their profession at the time of 9/11 or before. One-

half of the respondents, 50%, have 11 or more years of experience. The tribal response is very minimal at six responses compared to the over 400 tribes in the United States. The survey results cannot be generalized to the tribal community and can only be seen as an indicator. The information captured and categorized by area of concentration is as follows:

- **Approach** – the majority of the respondents understood the DHS TCL initiative, 83% vs. 17%. Most of the respondents (67%) felt that there is a better approach to capabilities. Comments indicated that the DHS approach was skewed or inconsistent, dated back to civil defense days, lacked coordination, and was not reflective of tribal needs. The current tribal approach varies focusing on response, mitigation, SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunity, threat) analysis or HSEEP (Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program) guidelines. Tribal respondents suggested that more of a regional approach involving trained state subject matter experts might be more beneficial.
- **Clarity** – respondents indicated that they understood the DHS capabilities approach. Only one-half (50%) indicated that they understood the interdependencies between the TCL and UTL. Comments indicated that the DHS capabilities element conflicted with other federal agency requirements. The interdependency element understanding is questionable as comments reflected non-related concerns: vulnerable sites, remoteness, and financial resources.
- **Collaboration** – responses indicated collaboration or consultation with tribal entities is non-existent and no comments are offered.
- **Value** – respondents indicated they used the TCL and UTL elements, 67% and 50% respectively. Comments, however, indicated the use was only as a guide based on grant driven requirements lacking a connection with sovereignty issues. The basis for the tribal implementation was founded on the direction received from their elders.

The tribal chart indicates that respondents chose more terrorism related issues as their primary focus. The six respondents identified 39 scenarios pertinent to their respective jurisdictions. While the terrorism scenarios account for almost two-thirds of the available choices in the survey, terrorism events accounted for 61.5% of the selections. The non-terrorism related scenarios accounted for 38.5% of the selections. The chart identifies Radiological Attack, Explosive Attack, Cyber Attack, Wild land Fire and Winter Storm as the top five choices; two of the five being non-terrorism related. If

DHS were to have chosen the top 15 scenarios most likely of concern to tribal jurisdictions, the list in ranked order would appear as follows (** indicates scenario as one of the 15 DHS scenarios):

• Winter Storm	67%
• Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Device**	50%
• Explosive Attack - Improvised Explosive Device**	50%
• Cyber Attack**	50%
• Wild land Fire	50%
• Improvised Nuclear Device**	33%
• Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza**	33%
• Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion**	33%
• Major Earthquake**	33%
• Biological Attack - Food Contamination**	33%
• Dam Failure	33%
• Tornado	33%
• Other	33%
(Other included high winds, hazmat, civil unrest, and bridge collapse.)	
• Biologic Attack - Aerosol Anthrax**	17%
• Biological Attack – Plague**	17%

Tribal results identified 10 events (denoted by: **) that are part of original DHS 15 scripted scenarios for the capabilities initiative.

7. Aggregate Results

The number of respondents submitting a survey totaled 185. Their years of experience in emergency management or homeland security are depicted in the following table.

Table 7. Aggregate Respondents Years of Experience in Emergency Management or Homeland Security

YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	# RESPONDENTS	% OF TOTAL
0-6	46	25%
6-11	42	23%
11-16	24	13%
16-21	30	16%
22 & above	43	23%

The aggregate survey results (local, state/territorial and tribal) are depicted in the following table. The comment section has been deleted as their influence is captured in the Summary section. The table structure is focused on organizing the questions and their respective response rates as they pertained to the four critical areas of concentration: understandable approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level of collaboration. The table is sorted by area of concentration referencing the applicable question.

Table 8. Aggregate Survey Results (with no comments)

AGGREGATE SURVEY RESULTS (with No Comments)										
QUESTION #	SURVEY QUESTION	AVERAGE		CONCENTRATION	LOCAL		STATE/TERR.		TRIBAL	
		POS	NEG		POS	NEG	POS	NEG	POS	NEG
2	Do you agree with the Department of Homeland Security approach to capability development?	52%	48%	APPROACH	52%	48%	51%	49%	83%	17%
6	Please explain your agency's approach to capability development in the comment box below			APPROACH						

AGGREGATE SURVEY RESULTS (with No Comments)										
QUESTION #	SURVEY QUESTION	AVERAGE		CONCENTRATION	LOCAL		STATE/TERR.		TRIBAL	
		POS	NEG		POS	NEG	POS	NEG	POS	NEG
8	Do you feel there is a better approach to developing capabilities?	59%	41%	APPROACH	60%	40%	58%	42%	67%	33%
12	Do you have any comments about the federal guidance regarding capabilities?			APPROACH						
1	Do you understand the Department of Homeland Security approach to developing capabilities?	79%	17%	CLARITY	76%	24%	82%	18%	100%	0%
5	Do you understand the interdependencies between the Target Capabilities List and the Universal Task List?	69%	31%	CLARITY	66%	34%	75%	25%	50%	50%
10	Were you a member of any Department of Homeland Security committee engaged in the Capability development effort?	6%	94%	COLLABORATION	4%	96%	12%	88%	0%	100%
11	Were you consulted, at any time, regarding the Capability development effort?	17%	83%	COLLABORATION	15%	85%	23%	77%	0%	100%
3	Does your agency use the Target Capabilities List to identify the capabilities it needs to develop?	63%	37%	VALUE	57%	43%	74%	26%	67%	33%

AGGREGATE SURVEY RESULTS (with No Comments)										
QUESTION #	SURVEY QUESTION	AVERAGE		CONCENTRATION	LOCAL		STATE/TERR.		TRIBAL	
		POS	NEG		POS	NEG	POS	NEG	POS	NEG
4	Does your agency use the Universal Task List to identify the tasks it needs to consider for capability development?	50%	50%	VALUE	48%	52%	53%	47%	50%	50%
7	Please explain why your agency uses the approach described in number 6 in the comment box below			VALUE						

The following chart depicts the aggregate of the applicable scenarios identified by all survey respondents with respect to their jurisdictional hazards and threats. The chart identifies the scenarios listed in the survey and captures the composite number of respondents that chose each scenario.




Chart 4. Scenario Applicability to All Jurisdictions

8. Aggregate Analysis

The respondents represented each categorical level of experience. Only 25% of all the respondents were new to the discipline after 9/11. The majority of the respondents, 75%, were members of their profession at the time of 9/11 or before. Over one-half of the respondents, 52%, have 11 or more years of experience. The respondents represented a good cross section of experience levels for the survey with a significant portion being seasoned professionals. Respondents did not overwhelmingly agree with the initiative. The survey captured very few positive comments, however, the vast majority were not complimentary indicating there was a better way to achieve a positive outcome that was relevant to the respondents. The information captured and categorized by area of concentration is as follows:

- **Approach** – survey results indicate that there is an understanding of the DHS capabilities approach. The results also indicate that over one-half of the respondents feel there is a better approach. Comments from each section indicate the respondents may understand the initiative, but they do not necessarily agree with the approach. The approach needs to be more jurisdictional focused on needs and hazards that are applicable.
- **Clarity** - the survey results indicate that the capabilities and the interdependencies are not universally clear to the respondents. Respondents indicate they understand the elements, but comments indicate they are “too cumbersome” and “convoluted” and there understanding is described by ambiguous terms.
- **Collaboration** – whether analyzed individual or on an aggregate basis, the DHS development exercised almost no collaboration and minimal consultation with affected stakeholders. Respondents indicated that DHS virtually disregarded whatever collaboration or consultation occurred in the development process and the implementation was approached poorly.
- **Value** – the survey results indicate that approximately one-half of the respondents see value in the DHS capability elements. The comments, however, establish the value as a guide and not an accepted practice.

The chart section indicates that respondents find non-terrorism related scenarios to be more prominent for their jurisdictions. The 185 respondents identified 1553 scenarios pertinent to their respective jurisdictions. While the terrorism scenarios account for almost two-thirds of the available choices in the survey, terrorism events only accounted for 56.1% of the selections. The non-terrorism related scenarios accounted for

43.9% of the selections. As in the local and state/territorial results, the chart identifies Pandemic Influenza, Wild land Fire, Flood, Winter Storm, and Tornado as the top five choices. If DHS were to have chosen the top 15 scenarios most likely of concern to all jurisdictions, the list in ranked order would appear as follows (** indicates scenario as one of the 15 DHS scenarios):

• Flood	79%
• Winter Storm	75%
• Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza**	58%
• Wild land Fire	55%
• Tornado	51%
• Explosive Attack - Improvised Explosive Device**	45%
• Cyber Attack**	42%
• Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion**	42%
• Major Earthquake**	41%
• Dam Failure	37%
• Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals**	35%
• Major Hurricane**	35%
• Biological Attack - Food Contamination**	34%
• Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease**	30%
• Other	29%

As in the local or state/territorial results, the aggregate choices include 9 of original DHS 15 scripted scenarios for the capabilities initiative.

The following table summarizes a comparison of the scenarios chosen by survey respondents sorted by order of importance to the jurisdiction (most important to least important). The colored entries depict scenarios that are part of the DHS 15 scripted set of events.

Table 9. Summary of Respondents Chosen Scenarios by Order of Importance

Summary of Respondents Chosen Scenarios by Order of Importance			
AGGREGATE	LOCAL	STATE/TERRITORIAL	TRIBAL
Flood	Flood	Flood	Winter Storm
Winter Storm	Winter Storm	Winter Storm	Radiological Dispersal Device
Pandemic Influenza	Pandemic Influenza	Pandemic Influenza	Explosive Device
Wild land Fire	Wild land Fire	Wild land Fire	Cyber Attack
Tornado	Tornado	Tornado	Wild land Fire
Explosive Device	Explosive Device	Cyber Attack	Nuclear Device
Cyber Attack	Chlorine Tank Explosion	Explosive Device	Pandemic Influenza
Chlorine Tank Explosion	Earthquake	Chlorine Tank Explosion	Chlorine Tank Explosion
Earthquake	Cyber Attack	Dam Failure	Earthquake
Dam Failure	Toxic Industrial Chem.	Earthquake	Food Contamination
Toxic Industrial Chem.	Dam Failure	Hurricane	Dam Failure
Hurricane	Hurricane	Food Contamination	Tornado
Food Contamination	Food Contamination	Toxic Industrial Chem.	Other
Foreign Animal Disease	Foreign Animal Disease	Foreign Animal Disease	Aerosol Anthrax
Other	Other	Other	Plague

The scenarios chosen by the various jurisdictions are very similar to the aggregate results. The local and state/territorial top five scenario choices match the aggregate summary. The remainder of the 15 local or state/territorial scenarios matches the aggregate summary, but is prioritized in a different manner. The tribal choices include 11 of the 15 scenarios found in the aggregate summary and are prioritized in a different manner. The prioritization differences are most likely jurisdiction dependent or potentially due to geographical location. The comparison validates the fact that the majority of the jurisdictions find non-terrorism related events to be of a higher priority than terrorism specific occurrences.

C. SUMMARY

Respondents understand the DHS Target Capabilities initiative, but they do not agree that it is the most appropriate to achieve the intended outcome. Many respondents indicate that the initiative is too federally focused and the outcomes or requirements are inappropriately grant dependent. Respondents agree that the Target Capabilities initiative

is a good guiding tool, however, the multitude of tasks and the design make it overly complex and cumbersome. They agree that some type of system is necessary; however, it must be simple, realistic, consistent, and make sense in accord with jurisdictional concerns. The survey participants call for an initiative that has a functional systems approach that is all-hazard in nature and not terrorism centric. The jurisdictions tend to use a variety of approaches, however, the common basis for the jurisdictional concerns target an approach centered on the known threats and hazard vulnerabilities. Survey participants indicate that the initiative development needs to be scalable to account for jurisdictional differences and completed in a collaborative grass roots approach among the stakeholders with national discussion. The survey suggests that the resultant initiative outcome needs to be mission based. The criticality to fulfilling the mission is defining the gaps and targeting the necessary resources to satisfy the need.

The information obtained from the survey and analysis of the current capabilities initiative is used to develop an enhanced framework. The next chapter discusses the new proposed framework in detail.

IV. CREATING AN IMPROVED CAPABILITIES FRAMEWORK

This chapter explains the creation of an improved capabilities framework. Explaining the improvements to a currently developed system or project requires a logical approach. While deciding on how to approach the explanation, I reflected on a situation that occurred during my college days. A close friend was extremely gifted and talented in the auto mechanic and auto body disciplines. He decided that he wanted to transform an old vehicle into a street rod. Jim went through quite a process to achieve the intended result. Based on his knowledge, expertise, and research, he conducted an analysis of his project car. Jim considered the internal and external factors affecting the project car performance. Elements he considered included the size of the current engine, air dynamics and industry developed performance reports. He then proceeded to look at alternative approaches that could be implemented to direct the transformation toward the intended result. Jim looked at different engines and their horsepower ratings exhaust systems, cooling systems, front-end suspension possibilities, and rear end gear ratios and integrating a nitrous oxide boosting system. After determining the methods or approach that worked best, he developed the framework for the vehicle that complemented the design elements chosen for the new vehicle. His framework ended up being an aluminum frame with restructured motor mounts, realigned suspension mounts and a shortened rearward reach to accommodate the chopped body. Jim performed a dry run test of the components with the new framework design among subject matter experts to ensure the intended outcome and functionality existed. After the testing was complete, Jim decided on the foundation that would move the vehicle to its top performance. This step consisted of determining the type of wheels, tires, tire pattern, tire width, and height to complement achieving the outcome. Finally, Jim considered the pros and cons of his new development toward achieving optimum performance in an effort to determine any final adjustments. He concluded that there were no necessary adjustments and this gifted person started showing the product of his hard work across the country. The success of

his efforts was realized in the performance record on the show circuit. Jim's old project car turned into a 21st century dream machine receiving many grand champion designations and a feature as the car of the month in the Hot Rod magazine.

The development of the improved Department of Homeland Security (DHS) capabilities framework is, perhaps, the most critical element of this thesis to understand. The following explanation will mirror the logical approach used by Jim in building his award-winning hot rod. The components of the explanation will include several elements: analysis, alternate approaches, framework design, system testing, foundation development, considering pros and cons of the approach, performance measurement, and a conclusion. Comments within some sections of the analysis are based on my 17 years of experience in the emergency management field working directly with these components as a planner or overseeing the development as the agency administrator. The first element considered is the following analysis component. The component is considered in two parts: internal and external elements.

A. ANALYSIS – INTERNAL SYSTEM

The internal analysis considers the Chapter II research and a review of two target capabilities. The analysis in Chapter II indicates that there are many incongruities among the federal directives guiding the development of the current DHS target capabilities initiative. The incongruities point to a lack of consistency, collaboration, and coordination. The development of the current approach was framed through consultations. According to Dr. Sharon Caudle, the DHS consultations with state and local partners are the downfall of the initiative as a replacement for true collaboration. In fact, several consultative efforts exist that are duplicative in nature given the fact they cover the same issues. The entire effort does not provide for any consistency toward achieving the intended outcome.

Further internal analysis considered two capabilities of interest to the author: communications and evacuation. The analysis raised additional concerns with regard to consistency and coordinated integration. The following exemplifies the incongruities residing within the capabilities.

- Communications Capability Analysis
 - The outcome and the definition for this capability are not synchronous. The DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL) establishes the outcome as continuous flow of critical information. This flow must be maintained as needed among multi-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary emergency responders, command posts, agencies, and the governmental officials for the duration of the emergency response operation in compliance with National Incident Management System (NIMS) The capability definition refines this element to wireless communications for exchanging voice and data.⁴³ This exchange is indeed multi-jurisdictional, but limited to mainly emergency responders and not as globally implemented, as the outcome would lead one to believe is necessary for this capability.
 - The TCL framework lists seven activities for this capability. Four of these elements raise red flags as being counter to the outcome, capability definition, and standard practices.
 - Provide Incident Command/First Responder/First Receiver/Interoperable Communications - Definition: In response to notification of an incident, go to the scene to provide and receive interoperable voice data and video communications.
 - Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support
 - Provide Federal Facilities, Task Force, and Recovery Assistance Interoperable Communications.
 - Return to Normal Operations - Definition: Initiate deactivation procedures for the interoperable communications system and return the system to a ready state.⁴⁴

First, the wireless communication system is supposed to be developed to receive voice and data so responders can communicate regardless of their location. They do not have to report to the incident scene achieve this result. Secondly, providing Emergency Operations Center, federal facility, task force and recovery interoperable communications support is not generally done through the wireless radio voice and data medium. Finally,

⁴³ Department of Homeland Security, *Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National Preparedness Goal* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/nlsearch/NLResult.cfm?nextrec=1&page=1&CFID=6316935&CF_TOKEN=65374843 (accessed June 14, 2007), 90.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 90 – 97.

deactivating the system and returning to a ready state is totally out of context. Wireless voice and data interoperable communication systems are in operation 24 hours a day and 7 days a week to mirror first responder operational timeframes. The prime example of this type of operation resides with the alert and dispatch function that is fully activated 24/7 and 365 days a year to notify or deploy first responder agencies. These comparisons illustrate the need to look closely at the integration of internal elements, as they are not clearly aligned with this capabilities' intended outcome.

- The TCL considers communications as a common capability. This capability is clearly not global in nature under the current structure as it refers to only wireless communications among and between response agencies and only in context to the response mission area. Communications are also required between various levels of government and between agencies that do not use a radio centric wireless system as their primary or secondary means of contact.
- This capability is constructed for a given mission area: response. The premise of this capability is further confused by the fact that it is response oriented and includes an activity for the recovery mission area.
- The critical tasks for each activity further confuse the issue as some are procedural in nature and not part of the first responder responsibility or are simply protocols that need to be followed: "Request external resources using EMAC and other mutual aid/assistance processes (inter- and intra-state)..... Use established common response communications language (i.e., plain English)."⁴⁵ The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a process that is used in the Emergency Operations Center and using "clear text" is a protocol.
- Evacuation Capability Analysis
 - The current DHS TCL indicates that "Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place" is a response mission area element. The DHS TCL establishes the outcome as "affected and at-risk populations (and companion animals) are safely sheltered-in-place and/or evacuated to safe refuge areas, in order to obtain access to medical care, physical assistance, shelter, and other essential services, and effectively and safely reentered into the affected area, if

⁴⁵ Department of Homeland Security, *Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National Preparedness Goal*, 93 – 95.

appropriate.”⁴⁶ The capability definition matches the outcome statement almost word for word with the exception that it leaves out the essential needs element.

- This capability relates only to the response mission area. The outcome, however, could potentially be applied in a prevention mission area if an explosive device was suspected and the need existed to evacuate the area.
- The capability nomenclature is misleading. Evacuation is relatively simple through an alert and notification system-requesting residents to leave the affected area. The outcome is much more comprehensive than the nomenclature leads one to believe because issues such as sheltering and mass care are included.
- The outline of this capability lists several activities. The activities, however, are misplaced or duplicative further confusing the validity of their applicability. First, the activities include global elements (planning, training and exercising) that are foundation elements to the entire system of capabilities. Secondly, once the evacuation and shelter-in-place component is activated, the implementation of procedures that is listed separately should be automatic once the primary component is activated. Thirdly, operation of an evacuation and staging area includes managing evacuees, yet these elements, for unspecified reasons, are listed as two separate activities.
- The critical tasks for each activity further confuse the issue as some are duplicative in nature and ones that are more prominent are not even mentioned. Duplication is evident as voluntary tracking is invoked under the implementation activity and then shows up again to be provided under the operation staging area activity. Implementing activities and corresponding procedures provide the mechanisms to achieve appropriate activation of the element and should not require a separate critical task.
- The animal evacuation component is a primary parallel to the general population evacuation. Even though animal considerations are accounted for in the planning activity, there is no mention under any of the other activities or critical tasks regarding this element.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Department of Homeland Security, *Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National Preparedness Goal*, 438.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 438 – 447.

- The DHS TCL framework lists eleven activities for the respective “Evacuation” capability.
 - Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems
 - Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs
 - Direct Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection Tactical Operations
 - Activate Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection
 - Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population
 - Collect and Evacuate Population Requiring Assistance
 - Operate Evacuation Staging/Reception Area
 - Manage Incoming Evacuees
 - Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
 - Assist Re-Entry
 - Demobilize Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Operations.⁴⁸

The organizational and relational structure of activities is questionable as to whether or not it follows a logical integrated approach. Activate evacuation and/or in-place protection is the parent strategy that should include the tasks: implement evacuation orders, direct the evacuation, collect, and evacuate populations requiring assistance and implement in-place protection procedures. According to the core outcome or definition, sheltering is a main component. Operating evacuation staging/reception area, managing evacuees and demobilization are all procedural activities that are part of the sheltering element, not evacuation.

The incongruities identified in the communication and evacuation capabilities provide insight that an organized logical approach or design to developing a given capability is necessary to ensure complete coordination and integration of all system elements. These elements must be considered along with external factors or information. The next section will highlight external considerations to complete the analysis picture.

B. ANALYSIS - EXTERNAL

Important to the development of this initiative is the consideration or analysis of any external information that can be utilized from the industry. As referenced in Chapter

⁴⁸ Department of Homeland Security, *Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National Preparedness Goal*, 438 – 447.

III, a nationwide survey within the emergency management community was conducted to ascertain that community's perspective regarding the DHS TCL effort. The survey analysis indicates that jurisdictions are in favor of guidance creating a simple, realistic, and consistent system based on jurisdictional concerns. The system development must be a collaborative grass roots effort inclusive of a national perspective. The approach focus must be all-hazard in nature centered on the jurisdictional risks and threats. The jurisdictions favor a functional systems approach that is scalable, mission based, includes gap identification, and targets the resources necessary to satisfy the need. These elements define the stakeholder's preferred outcome with respect to target capabilities development. The next section will discover other pertinent or alternative approaches that may provide insight toward the development of an improved framework.

C. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The literary review identified several methodologies to consider in developing the elements of an improved framework. These methodologies include the current DHS Target Capabilities approach – Capabilities-Based-Planning (CBP), Effects-Based-Planning (EBP) efforts, National Incident Management System (NIMS) parameters and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) component. The following sections will expand on each of these methodologies identifying the components that are applicable to developing an improved framework based on the preferred outcome established in the survey section.

1. Capability-Based-Planning

Current 2008 DHS efforts are focused on CBP methodology. CBP is defined by Paul Davis as “planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice.”⁴⁹ The application of CBP follows two approaches that have been developed and used by the Department of Defense (DOD) for war-fighting

⁴⁹ Paul K. Davis, *Analytical Architecture for Capability-Based Planning, Mission System Analysis, and Transformation* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1513, (accessed June 23, 2007), 7.

purposes. The agency's original approach is based on a requirements generated system. This development finds the various service components establishing requirements based on a set of scenarios. The requirements identify systems that are integrated at the department level. The DOD created a new approach that reversed the order of the original approach. The basis of this approach involves integrating the capabilities at the beginning of the process by developing the vision first through a collaborative process involving all the stakeholders. This approach is focused on outputs instead of inputs (tasks or requirements). The output or vision approach is analogous to an effects based rather than system specific development method. This mission or effects based approach was identified as a necessary element in the survey toward developing capabilities. A diagram of the two approaches follows.⁵⁰

Capability-Based Approach




Diagram 1. Capability-Based Approach

⁵⁰ Stephen K. Walker, *Capabilities Based Planning – How it is Intended to Work and Challenges to Its Successful Implementation* (Carlisle, PA: Government Printing Office, 2005), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil239.pdf> (accessed October 1, 2007), 11.

The left side of the diagram depicts DODs original approach to CBP. This requirements based approach is analogous to the current CBP target capabilities development using 15 scenarios. The right side of the diagram depicts DODs new effects based type approach to CBP. The new approach is mission based or analogous to Effects-Based-Planning.

The DHS effort follows the original DOD approach using specific requirements as the basis for development of capabilities. A diagram of the DHS process is included below.⁵¹




Diagram 2. Capabilities Development Process and Tools

⁵¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National Preparedness Goal* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/nlsearch/NLResult.cfm?nextrec=1&page=1&CFID=6316935&CF_TOKEN=65374843, (accessed June 14, 2007), 14.

The DHS approach utilizes scenarios to develop mission area tasks. The mission or functional areas are defined by the current system directives: response, recovery, protection, and prevention. The focus is on the functional area. The capabilities are the necessary components to perform the tasks. The tasks are the thousands of elements identified in the Universal Task List (UTL) and are the foundation for the capability development. This implementation approach is input (task or requirement) based and not necessarily, mission oriented. The mission areas, however, did not generate any disagreement in the survey and will be incorporated into the improved framework design.

2. Effects-Based-Planning

Effects-Based-Planning (EBP) is a military approach under development that is worth consideration. “The EBP methodology is outcome based instead of input oriented. Over the past decade EBP has been adopted as the name for a methodology in which the desired effect/outcome of any action, regardless of its scale, should be identified before that action is initiated, and which ideally should be complemented by its associated ways and mean.”⁵² “The objective is to realize an effect tailored to the prevailing circumstances.”⁵³ The concept is noted as an ends-ways-means approach. As noted above, the “ends” is establishing the outcome. The “ways” are the strategies to achieve the end. The “means” are the resources applied to the actions in an effort to achieve the strategy. The means to the end need to exist in order to achieve the identified outcome.⁵⁴

The EBP process also suggests that effects or outcomes are agents of change and triggers to other causes or issues of concern. Implementing certain actions will achieve the intended outcome considered as a first-order effect. These actions, however, may have a cause-effect in another complimentary or unrelated area creating a second-order

⁵² Alan Stephens, “*Strategy with Style – Effects Based Planning*,” Strategic and Defense Centre Studies, 2, no. 1, (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 2006), http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/analysis/Strategy_with_Style.pdf (accessed January 16, 2008), 1.

⁵³ Ibid., 3.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 6.

effect. Likewise, the second-order effect may cause a third-order effect. These effects are seen as interim objectives to achieving the final outcome or effect.⁵⁵ The following diagram depicts the notion of first and second-order effects.⁵⁶




Diagram 3. First and Second-Order Effects

The subsequent effects to an action can be seen as either complimentary or detrimental to the intended outcome. Regardless of their impact, these order effects need to be considered before implementing the action to ensure the intended outcome is not compromised. If the additional effects could be detrimental, adjustments should be considered among the actions or strategies to lessen the negative impact on the outcome. Adjustments may also be required after the second or third order effect(s) occur, as their detrimental consequences may not have been identifiable in the pre-development stages.

The philosophy proposed by the EBP methodology parallels the survey analysis outcome identifying the need to concentrate on the mission. The mission oriented approach keys on identifying the intended outcome first and then designing the subsequent steps to achieving the effect. The EBP outcome based process and the corresponding ordered effects are elements for consideration in developing the improved framework because of the integrated cause and effect relationships. These elements also speak to satisfying the mission-based concept identified in the survey.

3. NIMS Considerations

The Incident Command System (ICS) is the core component for directing the implementation of a system to manage any given incident. The implementation of ICS is

⁵⁵ Jay Kreighbaum, *Force Application Planning: A Systems and Effects Based Approach* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Government Printing Office, 1998), www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/kreighbaum.pdf, (accessed January 16, 2008), 39.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 40.

founded on a scalable management structure highlighting multi-agency coordination. The incident(s) are approached by identifying objectives, strategies, and tactics to manage the event. Incident objectives are defined as “Statements of guidance and direction necessary for the selection of appropriate strategy(s), and the tactical direction of resources. Incident objectives are based on realistic expectations of what can be accomplished when all allocated resources have been effectively deployed.”⁵⁷ This system is another example of an output-based approach defining the expected outcome or objective at the onset. The strategies to accomplish the outcomes are developed second. Finally, the tactics or actions are decided upon to achieve the strategies cognizant of the available resources. If the resources are available to complete the tactical actions, the implementation is deemed capable of completing the strategy. ICS integrates one more distinction regarding the proposed strategy: “Air Operations is responsible for implementing its strategic aspects--those that relate to the overall incident strategy as opposed to those that pertain to tactical operations (specific target selection).”⁵⁸ The distinction raised here is between strategic initiatives that are global in nature and those that are more specifically oriented to incident specific operational or tactical components. The interpretation is that the mission is supported by global or more specific operational outcomes. Since NIMS is required, a core component of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) and complementary to the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), it seems prudent to incorporate this current doctrine element into the enhanced framework. These elements have already proven themselves through years of successful implementation in the fire response community. Their consideration for the improved framework can only benefit system integration and enhance the logical approach that the strategies support: global or operational outcomes.

⁵⁷ California Office of Emergency Services, *Firescope California – Glossary of Terms* (Riverside, CA: Government Printing Office, 1999), <http://www.firescope.org/ics-guides-terminology.htm>, (accessed June 26, 2007), 12.

⁵⁸ California Office of Emergency Services, *Firescope – Field Operations Guide ICS 420-1* (Riverside, CA: Government Printing Office, 2007), <http://www.firescope.org/ics-8x11-fog.htm>, (accessed June 25, 2007), 34.

4. Capability Assessment for Readiness

Many survey respondents indicated they used the Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) as their guiding tool. “NEMA, FEMA, and the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) have developed a draft Local CAR because of the popularity of the State CAR.”⁵⁹ The purpose of the instrument design allowed states to determine the effectiveness of their operational program readiness and identify the gaps. The methodology is based on 13 Emergency Management Functions (EMF): “Laws and Authorities; Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment; Hazard Mitigation; Resource Management; Planning; Direction, Control and Coordination; Communications and Warning; Operations and Procedures; Logistics and Facilities; Training; Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions; Crisis Communications and Public Education/Information and Finance/Administration.”⁶⁰ Several attributes accompanied each EMF and the assessment of effectiveness is founded on the capability to execute. The EMF analysis determines whether the jurisdiction is “Fully Capable, Very Capable, Generally Capable, Marginally Capable or Not Capable” of implementing the corresponding attributes.⁶¹ The final analysis involves considering the need for each attribute with respect to the hazards identified in the jurisdiction to determine the absolute capability requirements. The CAR became the instrument to establish nationwide standards in the emergency management field. The work done with the CAR resulted in the creation of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP). The application of the hazards identified by the jurisdiction, gap identification and the implementation process is the take-away from a methodology that was commented on in the survey and worthy of inclusion. The respondents indicated that the foundation needed to be based on, not terrorism centric scenarios, but on the hazards faced in their jurisdictions and the gaps in accomplishing the mission.

⁵⁹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *A Report to the US Senate Committee on Appropriations – State Capability Assessment for Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 123.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 2.

⁶¹ Ibid., 3.

With the analysis and alternate approaches identified, the next logical step is to sculpt the improved framework design. The design considers the applicable components in relation to the intended outcome. The next section outlines the framework design that accommodates the applicable elements identified in the survey and research as necessary components to improving the current DHS capabilities framework.

D. IMPROVED FRAMEWORK DESIGN PROPOSAL

After 9/11, a heightened sense of anxiety existed to “do something” to counteract one of the most horrific experiences the United States had ever witnessed. First, DHS is to be commended for their efforts to put in place a system meeting the intent of a directive and congressional concerns in a relatively short timeframe. The President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) on December 17, 2003. A short 15 months later, March of 2005, the interim guidance was released establishing the “national system” to include the National Preparedness Goal, Universal Task List, and Target Capabilities List components. Appendix A contains a timeline based on major milestones for Federal Fiscal Year 05.⁶² Appendix B contains a timeline based on the key milestones for the same year.⁶³ These timelines are a good reference to establish an understanding of the development pressure DHS faced. As expressed in the guidance document, “It is animated by a sense of urgency.”⁶⁴ The research and development of this thesis to “Improve the Current DHS Capabilities Framework” had the luxury of 18 months plus the advantage of years of experience to study all the elements in formulating an improved design. The following proposed framework design is the result of those efforts.

⁶² Department of Homeland Security, *HSPD 8 Major Milestones* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004).

⁶³ Department of Homeland Security, *HSPD 8 Key Milestones* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005).

⁶⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Guidance – Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm> (accessed June 8, 2007), iii.

1. Design Methodology

The research indicates several incongruities exist causing concern over the current initiative. The thesis survey analysis in Chapter III indicates that the current initiative is a good guiding tool, however, there are several elements identified in the survey that are not part of the current CBP effort that should be part of improving capability development. In lieu of this fact, the proposed design for the enhanced framework is a hybrid of the current initiative and the other alternate approaches identified above to satisfy the identified needs.

In order to develop any type of framework, the principle definition for the initiative must be clearly understood. DHS uses the following to define the term “Capabilities:” “A capability provides the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from the performance of one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and performance standards.”⁶⁵ Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “Capability” as the “Quality of being capable, capacity...a feature, condition.”⁶⁶ The Webster definition speaks to having the means or resources to do something. That is to say, are you capable of, do you have the capacity to or are the conditions in place to achieve the intended outcome? I will first submit that the DHS use of “Capabilities” is out of context and what should be the result is a list of outcomes or effects that is designed to compliment the strategic global efforts and the mission area specific needs.

Intuitively Webster’s definition leads to designing an EBP approach and the principle component is the outcome, not a Target Capability. According to the NIMS methodology, ICS indicates that outcomes are either global or operational in nature. Based on the EBP and NIMS premise, the framework should be designed around categorized Target Outcomes (TOs). Based on the Webster definition, EBP philosophy and the NIMS elements, the following Target Outcome definition will be used for the development of the improved framework:

⁶⁵ Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Goal* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), <https://www.dhs.gov>, (accessed June 12, 2007), 17.

⁶⁶ Merriam Webster, *Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary – Fifth Edition* (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1946), 705.

- Target Outcome – Strategic effects or outcomes applied in an all-hazard context that are either global or operational in nature and designed to achieve the intended outcome in support of the mission.

The following framework section will describe the necessary design elements toward achieving an EBP outcome based result.

2. The Framework

Standard planning development parameters are used to define a logical approach for the improved framework. The integration of the featured components will be the foundation for the success of the improved framework. The outcome approach is a derivative of the EBP methodology. The mission area functionality is a component of the current DHS TCL effort. The Mission Areas (prevent, protect, respond and recover) are part of the current initiative and accepted nationally and will be used to organize the outcomes. The strategic aspects of global or operational outcomes are pulled from the NIMS ICS doctrine. The hazard or threat application and gap identification is an outgrowth of the CAR initiative. The following outlines the enhanced framework design. A graphic depiction of the layout is also provided.

a. Framework Components

- Mission – Achieve a heightened level of readiness by improving the attainment of the Target Outcomes through effective planning, training and exercising. The mission statement is founded on being prepared. Preparedness is achieved through the main elements of planning, training, exercising and providing the necessary resources to ensure all outcomes are effectively actionable and coordinated. These elements are an important component of the enhanced framework’s foundation.
- Goal - Develop Target Outcomes (strategic effects or outcomes that are either global or operational) through a grass roots collaborative effort that will improve the readiness of federal, state, local, tribal and territorial jurisdictions involved in being prepared to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from any hazard. The intention is to develop the resultant TOs in a well-orchestrated grass roots effort to achieve comprehensive inclusion of all the affected stakeholders.
- Task One - Develop the strategic **global** target outcomes that are common to all mission areas: prevent, protect, respond, and recover. The global or strategic outcomes are those effects that are applicable to all mission areas and most likely to occur regardless of the incident. Some examples of

global outcomes might include multi-agency information sharing, logistics, finance, or public information. These are global TOs that occur regardless of which mission area is active, the incident that occurs, or the level of government involved. The TOs identified here are those that should be part of each stakeholder's tool kit and developed as part of a national system to improve integration, coordination and reduce duplication of benefit. These are only suggested areas of consideration based on the writer's 17 years of experience in emergency management; however, they will need to be validated through the grass roots approach. It is important to identify any second or third order effects that may be outcome implementation derivatives. The development of the TOs will need to account for these effects and be adjusted accordingly. The adjustments will ensure the intended mission and other affected areas are not adversely impacted.

- Task Two - Develop the strategic **operational** target outcomes specific to the respective mission area(s). The operational outcomes are those effects that may need to be implemented in support of one or more mission areas, but not applicable to all and dependent on the incident requirements. A TO (such as population relocation) may be required as a prevention technique or a response to an incident; and, not applicable under the recovery mission area. It is important to identify any second or third order effects that may be outcome implementation derivatives. The development of the TOs will need to account for these effects and be adjusted accordingly. The adjustments will ensure the intended mission and other affected areas are not adversely impacted.
- Task Three – Identify the elements necessary to achieve each of the strategic global or operational TOs. This task involves identifying the elements or operational components that must be activated to achieve the intended outcome. One element that could be activated to achieve several outcomes may be the need for mass transportation.
- Task Four - Develop the relevancy of the operational outcomes per jurisdiction in relation to their respective hazards and threats. This task entails a process similar to that exercised in the CAR initiative. During the development under this strategy, the jurisdiction(s) apply their respective hazards or threats. This application allows the jurisdiction to determine if the TO is applicable and if so, what adjustments need to be integrated into the design to meet their needs.
- Task Five - Identify the gaps impeding the global and operational outcomes from being realized and produce a composite roll-up. At this point, the capacity or capability to implement the relevant TOs is assessed in comparison to the available resources. This process is similar to the approach exercised in the CAR development. The result identifies the gaps or breakpoints that will prevent the jurisdiction from implementing the respective TO effectively. These gaps in resources can then be rolled

up into a composite national report by jurisdiction, state, or region. This roll-up information will be critical for implementing adjustments or alternatives to facilitate implementing the TO effectively as outlined in the next strategy.

- Task Six – Prioritize the gaps and outcomes in order to establish completion deadlines. This strategy is perhaps the most difficult. Based on the criticality of the deficient outcomes and the magnitude of the corresponding gaps, prioritization occurs creating an approach mechanism for curing the deficiencies. The development could be done exclusively at a specified level of government (local, state, tribal, territorial, regional, national) or a combination of any one or all levels of engagement. The prioritization, of course, is dependent on available funding and other available resources to complete the development. This stage provides a reality check as some TOs may not be attainable.
- Task Seven – Assess the TOs. This task engages in the assessment of those TOs seen as unrealistic or unachievable. The value of the assessment is to determine if the outcome is necessary and if so, work is commenced in priority order to find a solution or develop alternative approaches.

The specifics and approach for each area enumerated above will need to be collaboratively developed among all the stakeholders. This effort is critical to reducing incongruities and disconnects in the final product and its implementation. The value added or unpredicted benefit of this development approach will be realized in the implementation phase. Realistically, the development approach should maximize acceptance and agreement by all stakeholders and minimize any impeding factors toward developing target outcomes and corresponding elements.

The following diagram depicts the enhanced framework and the corresponding elements outlined above. The true foundation of this entire effort is the involvement of all stakeholders achieving preparedness through effective planning, training, and exercising of the identified target outcomes.




Diagram 4. EBP Target Outcomes

b. Testing the Improved Framework

The next step is to test the enhanced framework just as Jim did after he had completed the design and development of his hot rod project. Testing in this case is perhaps, a bit more abstract since we are dealing with theory instead of an actual physical product. Since we are dealing with improving the DHS TCL framework, it is prudent to test the enhanced framework using one of the current target capabilities. The following evacuation capability application to the proposed framework, although not very inclusive,

attempts to apply the improved parameters to the evacuation scenario as a means of demonstrating its efficiencies meeting the outcomes derived from the survey. The collaborative planning process will be critical for delineating all essential factors at the various developmental levels.

- Mission – The foundation of the mission is being prepared. The foundation elements incorporate the global aspects of planning, training, and exercising for each of the outcomes.
- Goal – The collaborative process is yet to be designed, but it is the backbone for developing the global and operational outcomes in an all-inclusive manner involving stakeholders from all levels of engagement. Chapter V provides some insight into the approach for developing such a collaborative effort.
- Task One – Evacuation is not pertinent to this task, as it is not considered a global or strategic outcome.
- Task Two – Evacuation is an operational outcome germane to the respond mission area or possibly prevention. EBP is based on the outcome and evacuation itself is not the totality of the outcome that is the resultant. Reflecting on the TO definition suggested earlier, the nomenclature for this component could be more accurately cited as Population Relocation. The actual mission, effect, or outcome is to safely remove, relocate, care for, and provide re-entry assistance to the individuals and animals in an affected area. Mass Care is a necessary element to the Population Relocation TO effort and would not need to be identified as a separate TO. Shelter-in-place is not included in this outcome, as it is perceived as a separate effect that will be implemented only in certain circumstances and requires its own development. Second and third order effects need to be considered at this point to account for cause-effect impedance to other areas.
 - For example, the relocation effort may require the resources of the school bus system. If school were in session, a second-order effect would be created causing the inability to transport students to school. Consequently, a third-order effect regarding student attendance is realized potentially affecting the schools ability to receive grant funds based on pupil attendance days in a given year.
- Task Three – The major elements to accomplish the outcome include, but are not limited to:
 - Implement evacuation of the affected area – this element will require resources that allow for proper alert/notification and transportation to the relocation sites for either individuals or animals.

- Activate relocation sites – this element will require resources to manage the site; perform evacuee intake and registration; provide short-term medical care; food, clothing, bedding, entertainment and essential amenities; facilities for animal care; decontamination ability; psychological and clergy services.
- Transition individuals and animals to more permanent short-term living arrangements – this element will require tracking individuals or animals and engaging the resources of private industry, housing markets and other agency providers, such as Housing and Urban Development or FEMA, for living subsistence assistance.
- Re-entry to affected area – this element will require the resources to monitor the area to ensure that re-entry is safe, contacting the evacuees to inform them of re-entry implementation and provide the necessary transportation.
- Task Four – Relevancy - now, each jurisdiction applies their respective hazards and threats to the outcome to determine how the effect needs to be revised to accommodate jurisdictional issues. It is also possible that the jurisdiction will determine the TO will never require implementation or a different alternative is acceptable.
- Task Five – Once the applicable elements of the TO have been identified, the jurisdiction then completes an analysis of where the thresholds or gaps are in resources that will impede or prevent successful implementation of the outcome. The jurisdiction applying the parameters of this TO may determine that they only have the resources to relocate a population of 25,000 and not the required 150,000 borne by the elements of the disaster.
 - This step is critical to determining when outside assistance will be required and to what degree. The results can then be rolled up into a composite picture to give planners the critical information needed to design overcoming threshold or resource impedance factors for all TOs on a jurisdictional, state, regional or national level.
- Task Six – Prioritize the gaps and outcomes to establish completion deadlines in concert with available funding.
- Task Seven – Assess the TO to determine whether or not it is even achievable based on budget availability and the time to complete development. Depending on the available funding, the development may need to be done in a phased approach with alternative solutions identified until the elements of the TO are fully functional.

It is difficult to complete a trial test of the enhanced framework without actually implementing the process. For all intents and purposes, the testing or application of population relocation to the new framework, as described above, appears to make

sense and presents a more organized and logical approach toward developing TOs than the current TCL effort. The design appears to enhance the coordination among the necessary components as more integration factors such as second and third order effects are considered. The true testing will be validated through actually developing the TOs and implementing the process. It is not apparent that the enhanced framework will be a success; however, it certainly integrates the components described by the stakeholders in the survey as the missing elements of the current DHS TCL effort.

3. Foundation Elements

Jim chose the most applicable tires to move his hot rod effectively based on the output of the design. The collaboration among stakeholders and the preparedness (planning, training and exercising) components are deemed as the foundation elements. These elements were found in each of the current DHS framework capabilities instead of being highlighted as a global element. Based on the design of the enhanced framework, these elements are not specific to any given TO; they are common components that apply to the entire framework. These elements will be the wheels of motion, so to speak, to facilitate the successful development and implementation of the TOs. One of the most prominent issues identified in the research and survey analysis is the lack of stakeholder inclusion. The survey indicates that the inclusion in the current effort is seen as an after-the-fact involvement mechanism. It is clear, at least as observed in the survey responses, that inclusion in the development of the current DHS TCL was not exercised in partnership with the emergency management or homeland security community. In order for the enhanced framework to be successful, the inclusion is identified as an integral part of the foundation involving all stakeholders. Planning will be required to implement the foundation elements to ensure a certain degree of developmental coordination, acceptance, and consistency among jurisdictions.

4. Pros and Cons

The benefits of implementing the enhanced framework proposal are multi-faceted. The framework will provide a logical approach to the development. This approach will provide for maximum coordination and integration of stakeholder input and the

development of the respective TOs. Every project is likely to have some incongruities; however, maximizing the coordination and integration through a logical approach has the potential to minimize the existence of potential incongruities. The design of the framework elements satisfies the areas of concern identified in the survey. Incorporating the survey elements is a right step toward re-establishing credibility among all the partners in the emergency management community. Following the enhanced framework, approach provides for the identification of critical gaps impeding successful TO development. Such identification will allow developers to appropriately plan for resource allocation or alternate methods to achieve a successful outcome. This element is not prevalent in the current DHS TCL approach and is viewed by the author of this thesis as one of the critical impeding factors to its successful implementation. The real value added or unpredicted benefit to the enhanced framework is the grass roots development methodology. This methodology will enhance the development of the partnership network forming stronger ties between jurisdictions and acceptance of the system they are engaged in developing. Chapter V expands on this particular element.

The drawbacks to implementing the enhanced framework will be the need to start from scratch integrating the new elements. The redirection will require the allocation of new funds that will duplicate some of what has been spent under the current DHS effort. The design will benefit from the current TCLs that are applicable, but will require additional time to complete the new design causing the re-establishment of current proposed implementation timeframes. The implementation of the enhanced framework will also cause additional work within the complementary National Response Framework (NRF), NIMS, EMAP, and directive elements to ensure appropriate collaboration, coordination, and integration. The most prominent drawback will be the redirection of current DHS efforts and the retooling of guidance, policies, and program strategies.

5. Performance Measurement

Unlike Jim's project hot rod, performance measurement of the enhanced framework will not be as readily ascertainable. Much work will need to be done to complete the development. The components of the development can be tracked to determine the level of capability to implement the measures. Measuring the success of

the implementation, however, will occur over time as the TOs are actually implemented during real events. The critical determiner in successful development will reside with the after-action analysis and implementation of corrective actions to improve the system.

E. SUMMARY

Even though many incongruities were identified among the major documents for the CBP effort, the framework development identified additional incongruities inherent in the initiative. Other notable disconnects include listing elements such as “Mass Care” and “Firefighting” as TCLs when they are currently Emergency Support Functions in the current national plan.⁶⁷ To confuse matters, Mass Care elements are also listed as a critical task under the Evacuation TCL, “Res B3a 8.3/8.4.”⁶⁸ The real key is wading through all the confusion and duplication utilizing the pertinent information DHS has developed under the current TCL effort and integrating the elements of value into the new framework.

The new framework meets the intent of the survey results providing an organized logical approach. The construct is a grass roots effort that is mission based and formulated using an Effects-Based or outcome methodology. The design appears to be simple and realistic integrating common planning elements, the tenants of ICS and the current CAR by allowing for the application of jurisdictional threats or hazards. Ultimately, the framework is built on the necessary effects or outputs applying the principles of an all-hazard context. The new framework has the value added component of identifying gaps or thresholds and second or third order effects that will improve development accuracy and efficiencies to prevent implementation breakdown.

The EBP approach has many merits to providing organizational efficiency toward the development of a national system cognizant of the interrelated components and

⁶⁷ Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008), <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf> (accessed January 28, 2008), 58.

⁶⁸ Department of Homeland Security, *Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National Preparedness Goal* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/nlsearch/NLResult.cfm?nextrec=1&page=1&CFID=6316935&CF_TOKEN=65374843 (accessed June 14, 2007), 445.

jurisdictional needs. The “output” based approach allows development to be guided toward success employing identified “ways” and “means” that are interrelated. The current TCL CBP “input” based approach does not lead to the desired “end.” CBP inputs lack clarity, inherent duplication causes confusion and the results or “ways” and “means” are not clearly identified. “Establishing a logical and realistic relationship between the ends-ways-means nexus is also fundamental to formulating an EBP philosophy.”⁶⁹ “If the means to an end do not exist then the end is by definition unrealistic.”⁷⁰

The proposed framework establishes a logical Effects-Based approach toward developing global or strategic and operational outcomes with an all-hazard focus that highlights a foundation incorporating stakeholder inclusion. If the true focus is mission accomplishment, the drawbacks do not outweigh the benefits. In light of the incongruities identified with the current DHS TCL input based approach, implementation of the enhanced framework is vital for the intended outcome of the current effort to be realized.

Several elements have a direct cause and effect with regard to successful implementation of the enhanced framework. The next chapter provides an overview of future issues that should be considered in developing an inclusive and comprehensive Effects-Based-Planning TO development effort.

⁶⁹ Alan Stephens, “*Strategy with Style – Effects Based Planning*,” Strategic and Defense Centre Studies, (Summer 2006), http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/analysis/Strategy_with_Style.pdf (accessed January 16, 2008), 5.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 6.

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V. THE ROAD AHEAD

The previous chapters identified some of the overarching system wide and internal incongruities or disconnects with the implementation and integration of the current Capability-Based-Planning (CBP) initiative toward developing Target Capabilities. The proposed framework is designed to improve the current system. The nation will need to decide whether to adopt the proposed framework outlined in Chapter IV. If the choice is made to implement the proposed framework establishing an Effects-Based-Planning (EBP) approach to developing Target Outcomes (TOs), the elements of this chapter will be important considerations.

This chapter is a compendium of the areas of concentration recommended for consideration toward forging the “road ahead” to implementing the proposed framework and improving emergency management and homeland security preparedness efforts within in the United States. The intent of the chapter is to suggest additional areas of consideration that will improve the implementation of the proposed framework, reducing incongruities or disconnects and providing the catalyst toward generating additional ideas or thoughts that will have a positive developmental impact. The chapter discussion will focus on suggestions regarding framework implementation and process development, implementing a global strategic systems approach, developing a jurisdictional threshold roll up mechanism, contemplating a new approach to allocating resources and considering German collaborative and cooperative efforts or initiatives.

A. FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION - PROCESS DEVELOPMENT

The current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) capabilities initiative has been plagued by a top-down driven approach. The approach has been, at best, mere consultation with the stakeholders responsible for implementing the initiative. In order for the proposed framework to be accepted universally, a collaborative grass roots approach is necessary. The stakeholders must have an understanding of the new framework; agree to its tenants; be empowered with the ability to modify the model integrating stakeholder insights; and, be an integral part of the implementation design.

This vetting process is critical to the framework success and sustainability. The proposed framework must be reviewed by targeted subject matter experts. Targeted participants need to include emergency management and homeland security subject matter experts including federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal government; first responder discipline representatives; private industry and voluntary partners. The suggested vetting process format consists of conducting a series of facilitated working groups across the country to roll out the proposed framework. These sessions will fill several purposes. First, the gatherings will introduce the new framework to the stakeholders allowing them to understand the concepts and components. Secondly, the work groups will scrutinize the framework and provide new ideas toward the development of the final product. Third and of utmost importance, the stakeholders will be an integral part of designing the process for the development and implementation of the new framework and its accompanying strategic and tactical mission oriented elements. The process must be realistic, aligned with, and not counterproductive to implementation requirements faced by each group of stakeholders. It is imperative that one guiding process document is developed from the grass roots level. The current DHS guiding documents have not been developed collaboratively resulting in many incongruities. These incongruities have a direct cause and effect relationship impeding the success of the current Target Capabilities List (TCL) initiative. The integration of all elements into one document developed collaboratively will eliminate the incongruities and achieve implementation consensus with some sense of standardization.

B. GLOBAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS APPROACH

The incongruities identified in Chapter I and II exemplify the need for integration and a process to highlight system elements that need adjustment to enhance the outcome of the proposed framework. Some system elements may need to be eliminated, altered, or created to improve the effectiveness of developing TOs. The key to the success of such an effort resides in the identification and comparison of the elements that will lead to improving program implementation. A global approach is worthy of consideration based on the need to integrate the involvement of such a diverse array of stakeholders

that are an integral component of the current emergency management and homeland security arena. The following material is one of many potential avenues to address this subject and by all means, not the panacea; however, it is worthy of consideration.

It is prudent to consider the system holistically in an effort to maximize the effectiveness of the key elements. The intent of the effort is to establish a guide for improving the effectiveness of the new framework referencing the challenges faced under the current DHS CBP development. The elements considered are derived from the proposed framework, current DHS initiatives and the discoveries highlighted in Chapters I, II, III, and IV. Several models may exist and be very applicable to formalizing or organizing the elements identified. For the purpose of this discussion; however, the suggested model is based on Blue Ocean Strategy creating value innovation. In simple terms, Blue Ocean Strategy is focused on revision and creating value or a new demand not otherwise realized in any other format or market.⁷¹ The entire strategy centers around four principles: eliminating, reducing, raising, and creating targeted system elements to improve a process or program. These principles and the corresponding target elements result in the creation of an action grid. The target elements were identified based on the discoveries of this thesis and the author's 17 years of experience dealing with emergency management and homeland security issues or programmatic development. The elements may not be all inclusive; however, they provide a starting point for the discussion in developing a global strategic systems approach laying the groundwork for potential improvements.

The "action grid" delineating these principles and target elements in reference to Blue Ocean Strategy might be constructed as follows.

⁷¹ W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2005), 23-44.

Table 10. Action Grid

ELIMINATE	REDUCE
Inappropriate Expenditures Guidance Incongruities Federal Centralization of Effort	Integration Confusion Grant Funding Competition Reliance on Consultants
RAISE	CREATE
Preparedness Coordination Stakeholder Involvement/Acceptance Strategic Development Integration Measurable Progress	Unity of Vision Equity of Partnership True Collaborative Development Jurisdictional Thresholds

The next challenge is transforming the “action grid” elements into a strategy canvas graphically depicting a comparison of the elements between the current DHS CBP initiative and the proposed framework EBP approach.

The following strategy canvas depicts system elements highlighting the relative degree of concentration allocated to each one.




Diagram 5. Proposed Framework Strategy Canvas

The “value proposition” consists of those elements marked by the colored areas of the canvas. These elements raise or create positive enhancements. The true “value innovation” is marked by the green area of the canvas. These elements create the marked difference that has not been attainable in the past outdistancing the approach from any other efforts attempted by the discipline.

C. JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLD ROLL UP MECHANISM

Once the framework’s strategic global and operational outcomes and corresponding elements are developed among all the stakeholders, one aspect of achieving value innovation will include the analysis of the jurisdictional thresholds identified during the framework development. A mechanism will need to be developed to provide a roll up of the thresholds with regard to their respective jurisdictions: state, territorial, local, or tribal. Compiling these breakpoints and the types of required resources will provide critical planning and resource information regarding the readiness or preparation needed amongst the partner agencies to provide for timely resource deployments. This gap analysis is critical to the ultimate success of the proposed framework and has a value added benefit that will allow for readiness and budget prioritization, more efficient use of grant resources, identification of creative development efforts, the initiation of new approaches, the regionalization of resources and provide the information necessary to institutionalize a revised performance measurement mechanism.

D. A NEW APPROACH TO ALLOCATING RESOURCES

If all the pieces to the system approach align themselves in the appropriate manner, we may have the opportunity to consider a new approach to allocating resources improving response timeliness. The collaboration and development outcome will allow for the consideration of another possible approach to providing resources. The current resource system is based on a tiered response triggered by a given entity breaching its capability. Instead of relying on a breach in capability, partnering agencies could collaborate to determine which resources, at whatever level, are best suited to assisting the local entity toward achieving the necessary missions. Knowing the gaps or thresholds

ahead of time would promote state, regional, and national resource allocation planning efforts to improve resource allocation efficiencies. Front loading the response in such a manner will have the potential to drastically reduce resource deployment timeframes, improve response assistance coordination, and potentially minimize the magnitude of recovery assistance required.

The new approach could be the catalyst for the consideration of an enhanced declaration process. The declaration process could be reengineered to have a two tiered implementation process: response and recovery. With the collaboration of resources well developed and jurisdictional breakpoints identified, a response declaration could be done immediately releasing operational agency funds for resource deployment and mutual aid provisions. The second tier of the declaration would follow later triggering recovery assistance focused on the required thresholds, the magnitude of damages, and whether support was necessary through local, state, tribal, or federal programmatic venues.

E. GERMAN COLLABORATIVE AND COOPERATIVE EFFORTS

Anytime an initiative is being developed, I find it beneficial to look outside the box and consider other similar efforts by like entities. To achieve this goal, a comparative study of governments closely resembling the United States focused on Germany to research the subject of collaboration and cooperation that may enhance current capabilities or proposed outcomes. Germany is the discovery country because its government structure is very similar to that of the United States. The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic system. The system is guided by the “Basic Law” similar to a constitution. The government consists of the federal government and sixteen autonomous state governments called “Bundeslanders.” The system is founded on a division of powers similar to the United States. The responsibility for limiting the power of the state and conducting the checks and balances is divided between various branches of government: legislative, executive, and the judiciary. The German Bundestag, parliament, is the center of the political mechanism housed in Berlin.⁷² Since Germany is part of the

⁷² German Bundestag, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/index.html (accessed February 23, 2008).

European Union (EU), it is prudent to consider EU collaborative efforts between its “federal government” in Brussels, the “states,” and the member countries of the EU. The following material will discover EU and proprietary German collaborative and cooperative efforts.

1. European Union Efforts

Germany is a key partner in the EU with 26 other countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The initiatives implemented by the EU to facilitate cooperation began in 1999 with the Amsterdam Treaty. The process focused on strategic and operational coordination with a rapid and integrated needs assessment capability. The key to its success is linking national and regional initiatives in close coordination with military operations. Several efforts were undertaken in an effort to achieve effective cooperation and collaboration:

- The Helsinki European Council ensures the coordination of EU member state resources. They developed a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management in 2000 to oversee the management of civilian operations.⁷³ The new committee was charged with facilitating the coherence between EU pillars and a rapid response between the Union and member states. One of their key elements is developing the clarity in EU political objectives. This effort is emerging with the intent of managing multifaceted challenges. The prospective outcome is to establish EU elements that are complimentary, adaptable, and flexible depending on the situation. A civilian capability improvement plan between the EU members was adopted in 2006. The enhanced focus is a needs oriented approach, not unlike mission development during an incident.
- “The European Security Strategy (ESS) agreed upon by the European Council in 2003, specifically calls for a more coherent approach.”⁷⁴ These initiatives all affect the European Security Defense Policy of the Union and the member states. Role of Civil Society (RoSC) efforts are underway to flesh out the parameters for improving coordination and concentrating

⁷³ Institute of Security Studies, *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way* (Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006), <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai90.pdf> (accessed February 23, 2008), 25.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 105.

on peace building, policy coherence, cooperation and effective partnerships.⁷⁵ The key elements behind this initiative are the planning and implementation among all organizations in a holistic approach.

- Some EU efforts parallel the United States Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) initiative. The EU plan goes one-step further by actually targeting specific resource disciplines coordinated between the countries that can be deployed within a short amount of time. For example, “The European Council in Feira identified concrete targets for the police: 5000 police officers available for international police missions, with 1000 of them deployable within 30 days.”⁷⁶ In a similar fashion, several of the EU countries banded together in 2004 to establish a police response unit that will deploy a rapid reaction force of 800 men. The unit is headquartered in Vicenza, Italy.⁷⁷

The civil military relationship is definitely a central focal point among the EU members. “At the international level, there is an emerging recognition that government departments and agencies, the armed forces, education and training institutions, national NGOs, representative offices from, IOs, UN agencies and the private sector all need to work together more closely with respect to national contributions to international peace operations.”⁷⁸ The EU focus is well established and the coordination is still in the formative stages among member countries. The effort’s effectiveness will emerge as the coordination and clarity in objectives improves among the members. The key to success will be the acceptance of the efforts through the treaty between all the partners.

A unique feature of the EU is an organization called EUROPOL. “Europol is the European Union Law Enforcement Organisation that handles criminal intelligence. Its mission is to assist the law enforcement authorities of Member States in their fight

⁷⁵ Presidency of the European Union, *Partners in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: EU and NGO Cooperation* (Berlin, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), <http://www.cmi.fi/?content=oldprojects>, (accessed February 24, 2008), 13.

⁷⁶ Institute of Security Studies, *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way* (Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006), <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai90.pdf> (accessed February 23, 2008), 22.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Catrion Gourlay, *Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis Management in the Framework of ESDP* (Berlin, Germany: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy Juvaskyla, 2006), 32, <http://www.cmi.fi/?content=oldprojects> (accessed February 23, 2008).

against serious forms of organized crime.”⁷⁹ The agency is like the mother of all intelligence agencies. It works very closely with states, member countries, and law enforcement in the fight against crime. The management of EUROPOL is the responsibility of a board. The board is comprised of delegates from each member state. The board meets a couple of times a year to develop strategic elements and reports to the European Council. The council is responsible for EUROPOL oversight and is comprised of the ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. Member states provide representatives to a Joint Supervisory Body that ensures individual’s rights are maintained and monitors data collection efforts.⁸⁰

2. Germany’s Proprietary Efforts

The foundation of Germany’s structure for dealing with terrorism is quite different from the United States. Germany does not have a dedicated ministry dealing with terrorism. The construct of their structure shows that the responsibilities are separated out between ministries:

While the establishment of the Coordination Center is thought to have facilitated cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities, no central agency or person is in charge of all “homeland security” efforts. The most important domestic security and intelligence authorities, the BKA and BfV, are still divided among one federal and 16 state bureaus. The state bureaus work independently of each other and independently of the federal bureaus. Furthermore, German law requires a complete organizational separation between federal law enforcement agencies such as the BKA and state police agencies, and between federal and state intelligence authorities such as the BfV. An interagency group made up of the appropriate ministries, the heads of the BKA, BfV, BND, MAD, and the Attorney General conduct weekly briefings in the Federal Chancellery and provide strategic direction.⁸¹

The German government has undertaken many efforts with regard to border and aviation security, immigration, terrorist funding stream restriction and developed various laws to

⁷⁹ EUROPOL, *European Law Enforcement Cooperation - Director’s Introduction*, <http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=introduction> (accessed March 30, 2008).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Congressional Research Service, *European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), <https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=18513> (accessed February 27, 2008), 22.

deal with extremists and terrorism. The literature speaks to the necessity for coordination, however, there are no focused efforts identified to improve collaboration because the states are leery of losing their authority due to centralization efforts.

The German structure for dealing with other disasters, in general, is similar to the United States' framework. "The German approach to dealing with incidents, whether natural disasters or terrorist acts, is bottom-up, beginning at the local level, bringing in the state if necessary, and finally calling in federal agencies if they are needed."⁸² After 9/11 and floods in 2002, the German government established a Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response (BBK), within the Ministry of Interior, to coordinate approaches between the state and federal government. They designated the Ministry of Interior as the entity with the government's coordination responsibility. The BBK in coordination with the state(s) assumes coordination responsibility if a single state is overwhelmed or the event involves more than one state. "In the event of a national military crisis, thirteen different federal ministries have responsibility for aspects of civil emergency planning and response, coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior."⁸³ There were no specific initiatives identified as the catalyst to improve coordination and collaboration between the ministries for homeland security or disaster related events.

The research of German government systems identified two measures that were specifically targeted toward improved cooperation and collaboration. The Ministry of the Interior has undertaken an effort to enhance coordination from an administrative standpoint through an improved eGovernment system. The system is designed to reduce duplication and streamline the bureaucracy. A value added component of the system is "to facilitate electronic communication between citizens, companies and public authorities, citizens' portals that meet defined security and confidentiality requirements being provided by private or public providers, creating a secure electronic

⁸² Congressional Research Service, *European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism*, 20.

⁸³ Ibid., 23.

communication area on the Internet.”⁸⁴ The initiative may have some promise for ministry cooperation and collaboration; however, there were no evident benefits for disaster or terrorism events.

The Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) “Igniting Ideas” initiative has been touted as the foundation for success in Germany. The Federal Government has defined a national strategy for innovation policy through its high-tech strategy. The goal is partners in business, science, and politics work together to meet the challenges posed by the global market. The high-tech strategy defines the aims of this collaboration and defines new types of cooperation.⁸⁵ The initiative behind this movement is called “Futur.” The BMBF realizes, “No one must be left out! In order to achieve this goal, we need more precise scientific knowledge about learning processes and a competition to find the most effective methods.”⁸⁶ This effort is guided by the Innovation Council. The initiative begins with specific objectives in an effort to produce an interdisciplinary and integrated problem solving approach utilizing the internet as the communication medium. The initiative is based on global inclusion, to include the general citizenry, through the internet migrating to the development of focus groups. The focus group experts deal with the issues pertinent to their field of expertise. The outcome is a face-to-face meeting to develop the initiatives. The Ministry is then charged with implementing the final initiatives. “Interdisciplinary, problem-oriented “lead visions” (Leitvisionen) are supposed to be the major outcomes of the process, which shall reflect the demand for research and be translated into publicly funded research programmes or projects.”⁸⁷ A pictorial of the process follows “The Futur Process”⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Federal Ministry of Interior, *Focused on the Future: Innovations for Administration* (Berlin, Germany: Federal Ministry of Interior, 2006), http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Themen/Europa_Internationales/Veranstaltungen/Programm_Zukunftsorientierte_Verwaltung_en.templateId=raw.property=publicationFile.pdf/Programm_Zukunftsorientierte_Verwaltung_en.pdf (accessed February 27, 2008), 20.

⁸⁵ Federal Ministry of Education and Research, *A Profile of the Ministry* (Berlin, Germany: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung/Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2007), <http://www.bmbf.de/en/88.php> (accessed February 24, 2008), 2.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁸⁷ Kerstin Cuhls, *Government Foresight Activities in Germany: The Futur Process* (Germany, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, 2003), www.nistep.go.jp/IC/ic030227/pdf/p3-2.pdf (accessed February 23, 2008), 2.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 6.




Diagram 6. The Futur Process

The “Futur” initiative appears to show the most promise for developing a collaborative initiative among stakeholders to design systems, projects, and programs. The effort is in the infancy stages and has not been validated as to whether it will be applicable outside of the research discipline.

Comparatively speaking, either the approaches used by the EU or Germany are applicable in the United States because the structure and implementation is so similar. Implementing any of the EU or German approaches would require some modification of the United States’ framework that could be supported by simple memorandum, executive order, presidential directive, or federal law. Two initiatives stand out as possible solutions for the United States to improve collaboration. The first initiative is a combination of the European Council’s efforts to forward deploy law enforcement integrating all resource providers and the EUROPOL criminal intelligence initiative with a prescriptive governance structure. The EMAC system has already successfully coordinated state resource sharing during any event. To include complete resource provider engagement, like the European Council law enforcement or EUROPOL initiatives, EMAC would need to be expanded to include the federal government. The

inclusion could be done by simple memorandum of understanding between the states and the federal government. This effort would allow resource sharing among all states and the federal government to support a local event. The effort would require some minor modification of the governance structure, ordering, and deployment procedures to continue the same level of efficiency.

The second initiative that offers promise as a model to improve collaboration in the United States is the German BMBF hi-tech strategy centered on the “Futur” process. The system definitely speaks to cooperation and collaboration among all potential stakeholders. The process appears to have the components of inclusion, deliberation, and effective implementation. The formation of such an initiative in the United States could be developed and implemented by the federal government. The initiative would require no special promulgation to implement. The effort could be done through agency directive, policy or the DHS Science and Technology division.

F. SUMMARY

The system for cooperation and collaboration in the development of DHS efforts has many incongruities. The incongruities in program development and guidance application impede developing collaborative global efforts between and among federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal entities. Current approaches are not truly collaborative in nature and default to consultation as the primary focus. The “Road Ahead,” approached strategically with diligence and deliberation, provides many enhancement opportunities toward the development of a cooperative and collaborative global system. The thought of a collaborative and integrated global system has many promising attributes whose synergy will result in more effective and efficient mechanisms that are universally understood and accepted. The result will be a revitalized and improved emergency management and homeland security effort serving the citizens of the United States.

VI. CONCLUSION

A critical component of multi-agency coordination for given initiatives relies on engaging the participating entities and defining the intended outcome at the onset. I reflect back on the development of a major exercise that began with all good intentions. Multiple agencies began providing inputs to develop the event and all their good ideas started the snowball rolling. Before long, the development started to venture off in several directions and the magnitude of the exercise was on the verge of being unmanageable. Agencies were disconnected and each started to build their own inputs or components expanding the parameters of the exercise even further. Soon, no one understood the reason for the exercise, what the outcome was supposed to achieve, or whether enough funds existed to conduct the initiative. Time was extremely short and tempers were beginning to flare as the development was six months into its 14-month timeline. The exercise was doomed to fail due to lack of cohesion and direction. The management team finally regrouped and collectively identified the intended outcome. Strategies were developed to achieve the outcome engaging all participating agencies in the development. The exercise organization and direction changed from an input based approach to an outcome or mission defined derivative and the event went off as a huge success; the unity of vision was very apparent.

Even though the current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Capability-Based-Planning (CBP) approach to developing capabilities is well intended, the project is not without its shortfalls. The foundation documents and guidance express the intended outcome, however, lack of clarity and confusion continue to surface. The incongruities are detractors that severely impede the success of the initiative. The input based approach is not mission oriented or indicative of a collaborative effort among the responsible stakeholders. This approach is a prescription for internal element conflict and the development of a disjointed effort.

The results of a nationwide survey expressed concern regarding the current DHS CBP approach to developing capabilities. The respondents indicated they understood the intent of the current initiative and agreed a guiding tool is useful. They did not agree that

the current initiative is the most appropriate to achieve the intended outcome. The results divulged that the capabilities development was non-collaborative, top-down driven, too cumbersome and overly complex.

The respondents identified elements to successfully developing capabilities required:

- A national concept.
- A functional systems approach.
- Mission-oriented outcomes.
- Providing a simple, realistic, and consistent approach.
- Applying an all-hazard philosophy with jurisdictional application of risks and threats.
- Scalability to account for jurisdictional differences.
- A collaborative grass roots approach among the stakeholders: federal, state, local, and tribal governments.

The criticality to fulfilling the mission is defining the gaps and targeting the necessary resources to satisfy the need.

The proposed Effects-Based framework for developing global or strategic and operational Target Outcomes provides a logical approach. The framework relies on an effects-based approach as the primary driving force. The mission is supported by a goal and subsequent strategies. The entire focus is outcome or effects based integrating the necessary inputs through the strategy areas and their subsequent development. The result is an integrated system for developing Target Outcomes. The integrated system accommodates all the main theme elements identified by stakeholders in their respective survey responses. The framework integrates the primary effects-based concept with other applicable methodologies creating a hybrid approach to developing Target Outcomes. Integration of the other methodologies is critical, as they are complementary to primary federal directives.

The key to developing a successful national system with this framework will require the execution of a true grass roots collaborative effort among federal, state, local, and tribal governments. The development and implementation will require incorporating


all of the pertinent elements from the current DHS Capabilities initiative and those elements identified in Chapter V – “The Road Ahead.” This approach will foster developing an initiative applicable to all levels of engagement. The beauty of its execution will deniably be successful, as it will incorporate the missing components of most federal efforts. These components are the foundation of success to any initiative as implied in the exercise example above: unity of vision and equity of partnership. The benefit of implementing the proposed framework and its corresponding elements will be the rebuilding of the fragile government credibility. Stephen Covey expresses the importance of the credibility factor best: “At the end of the day, if the results aren’t there, neither is the credibility and neither is the trust. It’s just that simple; it’s just that harsh.”⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Stephen Covey, *The Speed of Trust* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), 110.

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
APPENDIX A – MAJOR MILESTONES

HSPD-8 Major Milestones: Secretary Ridge Approved Concept 3/26/04



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APPENDIX B – KEY MILESTONES



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APPENDIX C- ACRONYMS

ANSI	American National Standards Institute
BBK	Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response
BMBF	Federal Ministry of Education and Research
CAR	Capability Assessment for Readiness
CBP	Capability-Based-Planning
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
EBP	Effects-Based-Planning
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMAP	Emergency Management Accreditation Program
ESF	Emergency Support Function
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOG	Field Operations Guide
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GHSAC	Governor's Homeland Security Advisory Council
HSAC	Homeland Security Advisory Council
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program
HSPD 5	Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
HSPD 8	Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8
IAEM	International Association of Emergency Managers
ICS	Incident Command System
IMSWG	Incident Management Standards Working Group
MCA	Montana Code Annotated
NEMA	National Emergency Management Association
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NGA	National Governor's Association

NGO	Non Government Organization
NIC	National Integration Center
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NPG	National Preparedness Goal
NRF	National Response Framework
NRP	National Response Plan
PCA	Pilot Capability Assessment
PNL	Pacific National Laboratories
S & T	Science and Technology
SHSGP	State Homeland Security Grant Program
TCL	Target Capabilities List
TO	Target Outcomes
UTL	Universal Task List

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